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WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RESTRICTS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, CAN CONGRESS SAVE US?
AN EXAMINATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
MATT PAWAt
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress
is composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights are amply protected by the political process.
1
As one cynic has said, with five votes anything is possible.
2
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 1991, New York Congressman Stephen Solarz
addressed the House of Representatives and, in unusually harsh
terms, denounced a recent Supreme Court decision. The decision,
Employment Division v. Smith,3 had drastically reduced the right to
the free exercise of religion. 4 Solarz assailed Smith as a "dastardly
and unprovoked attack on our first freedom"5 and declared that
Smith "must not be permitted to stand unchallenged." 6 To counter-
act Smith, Solarz introduced a bill entitled the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).7
At about the same time, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a
bill to eliminate racial bias in the imposition of the death penalty.
Kennedy's bill, the Racial Justice Act (RJA), 8 was designed to
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1 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
2 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1185
(1989).
3 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judicialy, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1992 RFRA Hearings] (forthcoming 1993)
(unpublished statements on file with author) (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock
at 7) ("There simply is no substantive constitutional right to religious liberty any
more.").
5 137 CONG. REc. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
6 id.
7 H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
8 S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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counteract McCleskey v. Kemp,9 a criminal case in which the Su-
preme Court found no violation of the right to equal protection of
the laws despite statistical evidence showing that Georgia imposed
the death penalty unequally according to race. "I believe that the
McCleskey decision is a mistake," Kennedy told the Senate.10 "In
its zeal to expedite proceedings in capital cases," Kennedy declared,
the Court had "failed to recognize a glaring injustice that Congress
should not tolerate, even if five Justices of the Supreme Court are
willing to permit it." 1 1 After introducing statistical evidence
showing racial disparities in capital sentencing in several states,
Kennedy urged his colleagues to support the bill:
If we are to live up to our responsibility to fulfill the Constitution's
promise of equal protection of the laws, we must ensure that race
discrimination in capital punishment is eliminated. The Racial
Justice Act is a practical step to achieve the goal of making our
system ofjustice worthy of the name.
1 2
During the same Congress, Senator Alan Cranston launched an
attack on an abortion case, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 13
According to Cranston, Webster "sent a shockwave through the
country" by giving state legislatures "an open invitation to begin
meddling with the freedom of individual women. " 14  Cranston
described Webster as a "blow to all Americans who look to the Court
to protect and preserve fundamental rights and liberties " 15 and
warned that the case threatened to turn the clock back to days when
"unskilled, illegal abortionists preyed upon desperate women. " 16
To prevent such a turn of events, Cranston introduced the Freedom
of Choice Act (FOCA), a bill designed to protect the right to
abortion. 1 7  Cranston defended Congress's competence to pass
such a statute, claiming that "[i]t has long been recognized that
Congress has the authority, under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
and other provisions of the Constitution to enact legislation to
restrain states from denying due process and equal protection rights
9 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
10 137 CONG. REC. S7380 (daily ed. June 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
11 Id.
12 Id. at S7381.
13 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
14 137 CONG. REC. S641 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
15 Id.
16 Id. at S642.
17 S. 25, Version 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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to individuals."1 8 A year and a half later, Cranston returned to the
Senate floor, warning of possibly dire results in another abortion
case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
19
Mr. President, we expect that the Supreme Court will act within
the next few days, perhaps tomorrow, in a manner that will
eliminate any meaningful constitutional protection of a woman's
right to freedom of choice. It may be that the decision in Roe
versus Wade is not wiped out wholly, but there will be more in the
way of the direction of denying the right of choice to women.
20
Anticipating the Court's decision in Casey, Cranston introduced a
substitute bill which, among other things, specifically declared
Congress's authority to enact the law.
21
The RFRA, the RJA, and the FOCA have three things in
common that set them apart from most bills: each is designed to
increase the protection of a constitutional right; the Supreme Court
has specifically declared that the Constitution does not protect that
right to the extent the legislation would protect the right; and
Congress's authority to enact each is based, at least in part, on
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
Congressional attempts to legislate under the authority of
section 5 have become frequent 23 and it is not uncommon for
18 137 CONG. REG. S641 (daily ed.Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
19 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
20 138 CONG. REc. S9027 (daily ed.June 25, 1992) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
21 See S. 25, Version 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(4) (1991).
22 That the FOCA and the RJA are based on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is evident from the text of the bills. See S. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(4) (1992)
(relying explicitly on Congress's § 5 power); S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(1),
(7) (1991) (same). That the RFRA is based on § 5 is evident from the congressional
hearings on the bill. See 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Professor
Douglas Laycock at 24-30) (arguing that the RFRA is a lawful exercise of Congress's
§ 5 power).
23 See, e.g., H.R. 2691, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (prohibiting discrimination by
the states on the basis of nonresidency in the licensing of dental health care
professionals); H.R. 2190, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (requiring the states to include
voter registration applications as part of driver's license applications and establishing
other national voter registration measures); Amendment No. 255 to S. 358, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (prohibiting the counting of illegal aliens in the census
population figures), in 135 CONG. REc. S7879-80 (daily ed.July 13, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Shelby); S. 377, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (establishing a system of regional
presidential primaries and caucuses); S. 327, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prohibit-
ing lower federal courts from issuing injunctions using busing to integrate public
schools); S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (declaring that human life begins at
conception for the purposes of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), in SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 97TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., THE HUMAN LIFE BILL 1-2 (Comm. Print 1981).
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members of Congress to invoke section 5 when advocating their
bills. 24 Such legislation does not come from just the liberal end of
the political spectrum: members of Congress have introduced bills
to declare that embryos and fetuses are "persons" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; to prohibit federal courts
from using busing to integrate public schools; and to exclude illegal
aliens from the census population figures. 25 Yet, within Congress
there is no consensus on just how broadly the section 5 power
extends.
26
This Comment examines Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to determine whether Congress may use its enforcement
power to protect rights that the Court has specifically declined to
protect. Part I of the Comment summarizes the Court's holdings in
Smith, McCleskey, Webster, and Casey, and sets forth the legislative
responses to these cases. Part II explores Congress's power to give
meaning to constitutional rights under the enforcement provisions
of the Civil War Amendments. Part III concludes that, as a matter
of precedent and constitutional structure, Congress's power under
the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is very
broad and that the RFRA, the FOCA, and the RJA are well within
that power.
24 See e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S9028 (daily ed. June 25, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Cranston) (declaring that the FOCA is within Congress's § 5 power); 138 CONG. REC.
S9185 (daily ed. June 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Adams) (same); 138 CONG. REC.
E685 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1992) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (same); 136 CONG. REC.
H9008 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990) (statement ofRep. Schroeder) (declaring that the RJA
takes up a challenge from the Supreme Court to protect against racial disparities in
capital sentencing under Congress's § 5 power); 135 CONG. REC. H6954 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 1989) (statement of Rep. Ridge) (declaring that legislation to exclude illegal
aliens from the census population figures is within Congress's § 5 power); 133 CONG.
REC. S931 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (declaring that
legislation to prohibit lower federal courts from using busing to integrate public
schools is within Congress's § 5 power); 131 CONG. REc. S130-31 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (same).
25 See supra notes 23-24.
26 Some members of Congress have argued that legislation is unconstitutional
because it exceeds Congress's § 5 power. See e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1485-86 (daily
ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (referring to the FOCA as the
"Freedom 'to Kill' Act" and opposing the measure as beyond Congress's § 5 power);
136 CONG. REc. H261 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Campbell of
California) (opposing national voter registration legislation as beyond Congress's § 5
power). At least one of these members has, at the same time, favored different
legislation based on the § 5 power. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990:
Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
RFRA Hearings] (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (advocating the RFRA).
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I. THE COURT RESTRICTS THREE RIGHTS
A. Religious Freedom
1. The Court Discards the Sherbert Test
On April 17, 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment
Division v. Smith,27 an historic decision involving the First Amend-
ment right to the free exercise of religion. In Smith, the Court held
that the government may, without demonstrating a compelling
governmental interest, prohibit religious conduct by enacting
generally applicable, religion-neutral laws. 28 More specifically, the
Court held that Oregon could constitutionally withhold unemploy-
ment benefits from Alfred Smith and Galen Black after they lost
their jobs for using peyote in violation of Oregon drug laws, even
though the use was part of a religious ceremony.
29
Smith substantially revised the prevailing interpretation of the
second clause of the First Amendment's declaration that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the Free Exercise thereof."30  Previously, the Court
had generally applied a standard known as the "Sherbert test."
3 1
27 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28 See id. at 886 n.3.
29 See id. at 890. For in-depth analyses of Smith, see James D. Gordon, III, Free
Exerciseon the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants
of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. RFv. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Roald
Mykkeltvedt, Employment Division v. Smith: CreatingAnxiety by Relieving Tension, 58
TENN. L. REV. 603 (1991); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse
Ideal Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics and
Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388 (1991); Danielle A. Hess, Note, The Undoing
of Mandatory Free Exercise Accommodation-Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 66 WAsH. L. REV. 587 (1990); Kenneth Manin, Note,
Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise
Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (1991).
So U.S. CONST. amend. I. Since 1940, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
have applied not just to Congress, but to the states as well. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding unconstitutional the application to
Jehovah's Witnesses of a state statute which prohibited the public solicitation of
contributions without approval from state authorities). Cantwell applied the First
Amendment to the states by incorporating the First Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 303-07, which prohibits the states
from depriving any person of "liberty" without "due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
31 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963), the first case in which a majority of the Court held that a state may place
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That test required the government to demonstrate a compelling
state interest when it infringed upon a person's religious con-
duct.3 2  The Smith Court, however, discarded the Sherbert test,
broadly holding that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that
have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not
be justified by a compelling governmental interest."
3 3
The result in Smith was particularly surprising because the
Sherbert test originated in a case involving unemployment benefits-
the same governmental interest at stake in Smith. In Sherbert v.
Verner,3 4 the Court held unconstitutional a state's denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to accept
employment requiring her to work on Saturday, her sabbath. 5
The Court found that the denial of benefits substantially burdened
the appellant's free exercise of religion3 6 and that the state's
interest in avoiding fraudulent claims was not compelling.3 7 The
Court further held that, even if such an interest were compelling,
the state must show that denying the benefits was the least restric-
tive means of achieving that interest.
3 8
Before Smith, the Court had twice reaffirmed the Sherbert test in
the context of unemployment benefits. In Thomas v. Review
Board,39 the Court held unconstitutional the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job in a machine
company when he was transferred to a department that produced
armaments. As in Sherbert, the Court found that the denial of
benefits was a significant burden on the appellant's religious beliefs
(which required pacifism), that the state had not established its
interest in preventing widespread unemployment, and that the state
burdens on religious conduct only if it demonstrates a "compelling state interest in
the regulation").
32 See infra text accompanying notes 34-50. The first case to analyze religious
conduct separately from religious belief was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). In Reynolds, the Court upheld a conviction for bigamy against a free exercise
claim, rejecting the notion that bigamy is a religious belief and holding that bigamy
is an "overt act" which the state could criminally prohibit. See id. at 162; Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 303-04 (reaffirming the distinction between religious conduct and religious
belief and holding that belief receives absolute protection whereas conduct receives
a lower level of protection).
33 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
34 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35 See id. at 410.
36 See id. at 403.
37 See id. at 407.
38 See id.
39 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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had not demonstrated that it had chosen the least restrictive means
of achieving its interest.40 Similarly, in Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission,41 the Court invalidated Florida's denial of
unemployment compensation to aJehovah's Witness who refused to
work on Saturdays. In Hobbie, the Court found that the state had
burdened the appellant's religion and that the state had failed to
articulate a compelling interest.42 Thus, prior to Smith, the Court
had applied the Sherbert test in three cases involving a state's denial
of unemployment benefits and, in all three cases, held the state's
action unconstitutional.
In cases where the government has burdened religious practice
by criminalizing conduct rather than by denying certain benefits, the
Court has also applied the Sherbert test. For example, in United
States v. Lee,43 an Amish employer sought, on behalf of himself and
his employees, relief from the collection and payment of Social
Security taxes because his faith prohibited participation in govern-
ment welfare programs. The Court found that although the tax
system burdened the Amish's free exercise rights, 44 the burden
was justified because the government had demonstrated a compel-
ling interest in mandating contribution to the Social Security
system.45  Similarly, in Gillette v. United States,46 the Court sus-
tained the military selective service system .against the claim that it
violated the free exercise right by conscripting people who object to
a particular war on religious grounds. In Gillette, the Court found
that the "Government's interest in procuring the manpower"
necessary to fight wars was compelling enough to override the
burden on the appellant's religion. 47  Finally, in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 48 the Court upheld Sunday-closing laws against the claim
that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose
religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days. In
Braunfeld, the Court found that the state had a compelling interest
in providing a uniform day of rest.
49
40 See id. at 716-19.
41 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
42 See id. at 142-46.
43 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
44 See id. at 257.
45 See id. at 259-60.
46 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
4 7 Id. at 462.
48 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
41 See id. at 608-09.
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Thus, the Court has used the Sherbert test for over thirty years
to weigh the importance of state and federal laws against the
importance of religious conduct. In both the unemployment
compensation context and the criminal context, the Court has
employed the Sherbert test. It was no surprise, therefore, that when
the litigants showed up to argue Smith, they assumed Sherbert would
provide the standard of judgment and presented their arguments
within the Sherbert framework. 50  The Court's response was,
however, unexpected.
Despite Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, the Smith Court upheld
Oregon's denial of unemployment benefits and held the Sherbert test
inapplicable to "across-the-board criminal prohibition[s] on a
particular form of conduct," such as those at issue in Lee, Gillette,
and Braunfeld.5 1 The Court held that a strict scrutiny test like the
Sherbert test is more appropriate to equal protection cases dealing
with racial discrimination and to free speech cases than to free
exercise cases.5 2 In the former fields, a strict scrutiny test produc-
es the constitutional norms of equality of treatment and an
unrestricted flow of information. In the free exercise field,
however, the Court declared that the test would create a "constitu-
tional anomaly" by producing a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws. 53 The Court viewed laws that expressly single out
religious practices as subject to the Sherbert test, but held that
"generally applicable, religion-neutral laws" stand on a different
footing.54 In other words, the government may burden religious
conduct as an incidental effect of an otherwise neutral scheme.
50 See 1990 RFRA Hearings, supra note 26, at 42 (1990) (statement of Rev. Robert
P. Dugan,Jr., Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals).
51 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. The Court distinguished another group of free
exercise cases by declaring them to involve more constitutional infirmities than the
violation of the free exercise right. The Court interpreted Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a state licensing system for the solicitation of
religious and charitable contributions), as a free exercise plus free speech case. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. Similarly, the Court interpreted Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school attendance laws), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (same), as free exercise plus substantive due process
parental rights cases. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1. The Court concluded that the
Oregon law did not involve such a "hybrid" situation, id. at 882, and apparently
believed that Cantwell, Pierce, and Yoder would have been decided differently had the
free exercise claims in those cases stood alone. See id.
52 See id. at 885-86.
53 Id. at 886.
54 Id. at 886 n.3.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned that to continue
to apply the Sherbert test would be "courting anarchy" because a
great many laws run afoul of religious conduct.55 To justify this
conclusion the Court marched out a "parade of horribles,"
56
warning that compulsory military service laws, health and safety
laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, welfare
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection
laws, and racial discrimination laws would all be in danger if the test
were to be applied to them.
57
The Court declared that the political process affords ample
protection to religious freedom. 58  It cited a number of state
statutes exempting the religious use of peyote from criminal laws
and noted that to say that such an exemption is desirable is not to
say that "the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned
by the courts."59 The Court recognized that leaving this accommo-
dation to the political process might place minority religions at a
disadvantage, but believed that this was an "unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government" preferable to the anarchy of
allowingjudges to weigh the importance of religious beliefs against
the importance of laws.
60
55 See id. at 888-89.
56 Id. at 889 n.5.
57 See id. at 888-89. Another reason the Court cited for discarding the Sherbert test
was that there were several free exercise cases in which the Court had not applied the
Sherbert test at all. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84. For this proposition, the Court cited
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (upholding,
without showing a compelling state interest, governmental logging and road
construction activities on religious Native American lands); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding, without showing a compelling state interest,
a prison's refusal to excuse an inmate from work requirements in order to attend
worship services); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 (1986) (upholding, without
showing a compelling state interest, the government's identification of people by
social security number even though it violated a Native American religious tenet);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding, without showing a
compelling state interest, military dress regulations forbidding the wearing of
yarmulkes).
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2. Justice O'Connor Would Retain the Sherbert Test
In a sharply worded opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice
O'Connor criticized the majority's rejection of the Sherbert test and
argued that the Court should retain the test. 61 Justice O'Connor
contended that the Sherbert test was both a workable and just means
of resolving conflicts between government and religious liberty.
Her reasoning sheds light on the motivations behind the RFRA.
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor asserted that the First
Amendment does not distinguish between generally applicable laws
and those directly targeting religious conduct. 62 Justice O'Connor
noted that Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission63 had
rejected such an interpretation and she reasoned that if the
protection of religious freedom is to have any vitality, it ought not
to be reserved for instances in which the state enacts laws patently
targeting religion.64 She quite sensibly declared that "few States
would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burden-
ing a religious practice as such."
65
Justice O'Connor also took issue with the Court's declaration
that religious freedom from generally applicable laws is a constitu-
tional anomaly. Rather, she averred, religious freedom is as much
a constitutional norm as freedom from discrimination and freedom
of speech.66 She added that the Court's "parade of horribles"
demonstrates not that the Sherbert test results in anarchy, but that
61 See id. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
62 See id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
63 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
64 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Id. (O'ConnorJ., concurring in thejudgment). Additionally,Justice O'Connor
responded to the Court's analysis of the so-called hybrid cases, see supra note 51, by
noting that in Cantwell and Yoder the Court had explicitly based its holding on the
free exercise claim. See id. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
MoreoverJustice O'Connor denied that the Court had rejected or declined to apply
the Sherbert test in recent cases. See supra note 57. Rather, she suggested that in Roy
and Lyng the Court expressly distinguished Sherbert on the ground that the
government itself need not alter its internal affairs to comport with particular
religious beliefs. See id. at 900 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986)). Justice O'Connor stated that Goldman and
Shabazz were cases in which the Sherbert test did not apply because the Court's review
of military and prison regulations is far more deferential than when the Court reviews
burdens on civilians or the non-prisoner population. See id. at 900-01 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Thus, she argued, the Court should not view those
cases as controlling paradigm free exercise cases such as Smith. See id. at 901
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the Court has been quite able to strike a sensible balance between
religious liberty and governmental interests.
67
Finally, Justice O'Connor refused to accept the majority's
proposition that the oppression of minority religious practice is an
unavoidable consequence of democracy. 68 Rather, she claimed
that the First Amendment was added to the Constitution precisely
to protect religious minorities. Justice O'Connor closed her
argument with a famous quote from Justice Jackson:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.6 9
Paradoxically, the legislative movement to enact the RFRA is
based both on Justice O'Connor's notion that the judiciary is quite
capable of balancing the importance of religious conduct against
state interests and on the majority's belief that religious freedom
67 See id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 1990 RFRA
Hearings, supra note 26, at 54 (statement ofJohn H. Buchanan,Jr., Chairman, People
For The American Way Action Fund) ("[justice Scalia's majority opinion listed]
several types of government rules ... where the Court has found a compelling state
interest .... In so doing, we believe thatJustice Scalia unwittingly proved the very
point at issue here today: the system worksl").
68 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).69 Id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). In the last part of her opinion,
Justice O'Connor applied the Sherbert test to the facts in Smith. She concluded that
Oregon had demonstrated a compelling interest in stemming the drug trade and
could therefore burden the Native American Church's use of peyote. See id. at 903-07
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
MarshalljoinedJustice O'Connor's opinion insofar as it called for the retention of the
Sherbert test, but they did not join the portion of her opinion that would have found
that the state's interest was compelling. See id. at 891 n.*. Justice Blackmun's dissent
examined the use of peyote in Oregon and found that its religious use did not pose
a danger of furthering the drug trade. See id. at 911-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He noted that the religious use of peyote might actually inhibit the drug trade
because the Native American Church prohibits the use of alcohol and other drugs
and even prohibits the use of peyote outside of its religious services. See id. at 914
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed out that Oregon had only once
prosecuted a person for the religious use of peyote. See id. at 911 n.3 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) (citing State v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142 (Or. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976)). Thus, he concluded that the state's interest in stemming the drug trade by
prohibiting the religious use of peyote was not compelling. See id. at 921 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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can be protected through the political process. Whereas Smith
deferred the protection of religious freedom to the legislature, the
RFRA bounces the ball right back to the Court.
3. Congress Responds to Smith
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is designed to counter-
act the Court's decision in Smith by reestablishing the Sherbert
test.70 Specifically, the RFRA would prohibit the state and federal
governments from restricting a person's exercise of religion without
demonstrating both a compelling governmental interest in the
restriction and that the restriction is the least restrictive means of
achieving the governmental objective.7 1  The bill also would
provide a civil remedy and would authorize the recovery of
attorneys' fees.
72
Significantly, the bill guarantees application of the Sherbert test
"in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened."7 3 This
70 See H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Representative Solarz and Senator
Biden had introduced similar bills in the previous Congress. See H.R. 5377, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 3254, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
7 'See H.R. 2797 § 3(a)-(b).
72 See id. §§ 3(c), 4. H.R. 2797, like Senator Biden's bill in the previous Congress,
applies its restrictions to any person "acting under color of law." Id. § 5(1); S. 3254
§ 4(1). If the Court's interpretation of a similar color of law provision in the civil
rights field were applied to the Senate bill, a state actor would be acting under color
of state law (and thus violating the RFRA) even if the actor were not acting pursuant
to state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (holding that a police
officer who violated a person's constitutional rights but who also violated state law
was nonetheless acting "under color of state law" for purposes of a Reconstruction-era
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)). Thus, the RFRA creates a cause of
action against state actors in states that nominally give persons the same rights as the
RFRA but that, in practice, do not protect those rights.
In the 102d Congress, the RFRA became bogged down in an abortion
controversy. Abortion opponents charged that the bill would give an abortion right
to women who claim a religious reason for seeking abortions. See 1992 RFRA
Hearings, supra note 4, (statement of Mark Choptko, General Counsel, U.S. Catholic
Conference at 8) (urging Congress to adopt an abortion neutrality provision); id.
(statement ofJames Bopp, General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee at
cover page) (arguing that the RFRA "must expressly exclude a right to abortion"); id.
(statement of Professor Douglas Laycock at 16-17) (urging Congress to not carve out
exceptions to the RFRA but to return the free exercise right to where it would have
been without Smith); see also Larry Witham, Abortion Clouds Bill on Religion, WASH.
TIMEs, Mar. 2, 1992, at A6. In response to this controversy, Representative
Christopher Smith introduced the "Religious Freedom Act of 1991," a bill to
reestablish the Sherbert test, but that prevents women from using the legislation to
challenge abortion regulations. See H.R. 4040, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991); see
also 137 CONG. REC. E4186 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Smith).
73 H.R. 2797 § 2(b) (emphasis added).
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wording makes the RFRA apply broadly. Prior to Smith, the Court
did not apply the Sherbert test to all cases in which government
burdened religious conduct but, starting in 1986, had carved out
exceptions for military regulations, prison regulations, and internal
government regulations. 74 By explicitly applying itself to all cases
in which the government burdens religion, the RFRA would return
the law not to the status quo ante Smith but to the status quo ante
1986. This legislative approach eliminates the difficulty of having
the courts determine which government actions are internal or
similar to military or prison regulations. Under the RFRA, all
government burdens on religious conduct would be subject to the
Sherbert test.
75
While it is impossible under Smith to completely withdraw free
exercise rights from the majority's will (because even if enacted the
RFRA would be subject to repeal or amendment), the RFRA will
unquestionably withdraw free exercise rights from the vicissitudes
of state legislatures. Moreover, repealing or amending laws that
protect constitutional rights is difficult to do; once such laws are on
the books, they tend to become highly respected components of our
democracy.76  Enacting the RFRA would thus create a serious
obstacle to efforts to restrict religious freedom.
There is some irony in retreating to the majoritarian process in
order to protect individual freedom. However, the RFRA does not
place control over individual rights in the hands of the majority on
a case-by-case basis. Rather, by returning the free exercise right to
its former status, the RFRA requires the judicial branch to apply the
Sherbert test. In other words, the RFRA leaves religious exercise
controversies "just where they would be under the Free Exercise
Clause if Smith... had never happened."
77
74 See supra note 57.
75 This makes sense if one views the cases addressing military, prison, and internal
government regulations as having held those governmental interests to be compelling.
Cf Kristen L. Boyles, Note, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1117, 1139 n.144 (1991)
(contending that the "internal notion" is problematic).
76 See Letter from Walter Dellinger, Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law, to Senator GeorgeJ. Mitchell, Majority Leader, United States Senate 1 n.1 (Feb.
6, 1992) [hereinafter Letter from Professor Dellinger] ("The continued reverence for
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 demonstrates that a
federal legislative solution to an important problem, once achieved, can become a
permanent part of our national laws") (on file with author).
7 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock at
16).
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B. The Right to Abortion
1. Webster and Casey
If it can be said that the Supreme Court used an axe to pare the
free exercise right, it might also be said that the Court has chipped
away at the abortion right with a pen knife. Nonetheless, over the
last five years, the Court has sedulously, if incoherently, cut back the
abortion right. As it now stands, the abortion right is significantly
less protective than when Roe v. Wade78 and Doe v. Bolton79 estab-
lished the right in 1973.
The Fourteenth Amendment holding in Roe grew out of a line
of cases holding that the right to due process of law, as it pertains
to individual liberty, provides a fundamental right to control one's
own body.8 0 Specifically, in Roe, the Court held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendmente l prohibits the states
from denying a woman the right to an abortion during the first two
trimesters of a pregnancy.82 During the third trimester, when the
fetus has reached viability, the state's interest in protecting potential
life becomes compelling and the state may then proscribe abortion
except when it would endanger the life or health of the mother.
83
Since Roe, the states have attempted to regulate the abortion
right in many ways. Most of these attempts have been unsuccessful:
The Court has... invalidated laws requiring that women seeking
abortions be given detailed descriptions of fetal development,
informed of particular physical and psychological risks associated
with abortion, and reminded of the availability of assistance from
78 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
80 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (holding that states cannot make the use of contraceptives by married
couples a crime); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that for the state
to procure evidence by stomach-pumping an individual violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding
unconstitutional a state law providing for the sterilization of persons convicted two
or more times of certain felonies); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw 1337-41 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the evolution of the right to bodily
integrity).
81 "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
S See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
83 See id. at 163-64.
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the father or from social service agencies should the woman
decide to give birth. Moreover, states cannot require that a
woman wait for a statutorily fixed period after signing a consent
form before the abortion procedure may be performed....
Blanket requirements of third-party consent to a woman's
decision to have an abortion are unconstitutional even as applied
only to non-therapeutic procedures, regardless of the woman's age.
The Court has been unwilling to allow states to give either the
pregnant woman's husband or her parents an absolute veto over
an abortion that the states themselves would be powerless to
forbid.... Requirements of parental consent must provide for an
alternative form of approval-a judicial "bypass"-for a minor who
is sufficiently mature to make the decision herself, or who can
demonstrate that an abortion would be in her best interests.
8 4
For many years, this was the law governing abortion. Although
the Court upheld some restrictions on the abortion right during the
1970s and 1980s, the Court's treatment of the right remained
essentially static for most of this period.85
Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court decided Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services,86 a case involving a challenge to a Missouri law
regulating abortions. Webster signalled a major turning point in the
Court's abortion jurisprudence by undermining the strict scrutiny
standard Roe had established as the constitutional measure of
restrictions on the abortion right.8 7 In this sense, Webster resem-
bles Smith.
In contrast to Smith, however, the Webster Court could not
muster a majority to determine a standard to replace the strict
scrutiny standard.88  The Missouri statute contained several
different provisions, one of which appeared to require viability
testing for all abortions performed during or after the twentieth
week of pregnancy.8 9 The viability-testing provision offered the
most direct challenge to Roe because the Court had previously held
84 TRIBE, supra note 80, at 1343-44 (citations omitted).
8 See DavidJ. Zampa, Note, The Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence: Will the
Supreme Court Pass the "Albatross"Back to the States?, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 731, 763
(1990) (arguing that Webster marks the end of an era of relative consistency in
abortion jurisprudence). This note offers an excellent summary of the Court's
abortion jurisprudence from Roe through Webster.
86 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
87 See Zampa, supra note 85, at 763-64.
88 In Smith the Court lowered the standard to a rational basis test for most state
restrictions of the free exercise right. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
89 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 501.
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that Roe prohibits the states from participating in the viability
determination. 0 In interpreting the viability-testing provision,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Kennedy,
disparaged the Roe trimester approach and adopted a "modified
rationality standard "91 which would simply require that the abor-
tion restriction "permissibly further[] the State's interest in
protecting potential human life."92 Nonetheless, the plurality
believed that while the Missouri statute challenged the Roe frame-
work, the statute did not challenge Roe itself because it did not seek
to ban pre-viability abortions. 93 The plurality thus sought to
modify but not overrule Roe.
94
Justice O'Connor concurred in the plurality's judgment but
thought that the Missouri statute did not provide the opportunity
to challenge the trimester framework of Roe.95 She nonetheless
offered her own standard to measure restrictions on the right to
abortion: she would hold a restriction unconstitutional if it
imposed an "undue burden on a woman's abortion decision."
96
Justice Scalia also concurred in the plurality's judgment, arguing
that the Court should simply overturn Roe.97 Thus, five members
of the Court voted to uphold a law that imposed a previously
prohibited restriction on the abortion right. More importantly,
those five justices also voted to weaken the compelling state interest
test-though they could not agree on what should replace the test.
98
go See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
91 Zampa, supra note 85, at 772.
92 Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20.
93 See id. at 521 (Rehnquist, C.J.)
94 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J.)
95 See id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
97 See id. at 536-37 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
98 justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, lodged a strong
dissent. Justice Blackmun concurred only in the Court's holding that the respon-
dent's challenge to one section of the Missouri statute was moot. See id. at 541 n.1
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun, who
wrote the majority opinion in Roe, argued passionately for the retention of the Roe
framework and for the strict scrutiny of restrictions on the abortion right. See
generally id. at 537-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Blackmun concluded that "[flor today, the women of this Nation still retain
the liberty to control their destinies." But, he noted, "the signs are evident and very
ominous, and a chill wind blows." Id. at 560 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also concurred in part and dissented in part. He
agreed with the Court on the mootness issue but, likeJustice Blackmun, would have
held the rest of the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 560 (Stevens,J., concurring in
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The next abortion rights case did little to resolve the confusion.
Pennsylvania accepted the Court's "open invitation" 99 to restrict
the abortion right and passed a law regulating abortion in a number
of ways. The Supreme Court considered the Pennsylvania statute
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."°° The most notable sections of
the statute require that, at least twenty-four hours before the
abortion is performed, a woman seeking an abortion be informed
that she may review "printed materials which describe the unborn
child" and have access to a list of agencies that offer alternatives to
abortion; that a married woman seeking an abortion sign a
statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her
intended abortion; and that a minor seeking an abortion obtain the
informed consent of one of her parents or the permission of a
judge. 10 1 Only women in a "medical emergency" may gain ex-
emption from these provisions.
102
By the time the challenge to this law reached the Supreme
Court, President Bush, an opponent of abortion rights,103 had
replaced two of the dissenters in Webster, Justices Brennan and
Marshall, with two new appointees, Justices Souter and Thomas.
Thus, many people expected the Court to overrule Roe out-
right.1
04
In an unexpected decision, however, the Casey Court voted to
uphold the essential holding of Roe protecting a woman's right to
have an abortion before fetal viability. Justices Kennedy, Souter,
and O'Connor delivered a joint opinion that praised the Roe
trimester framework. However, the joint opinion applied Justice
O'Connor's undue burden standard, leading to the invalidation of
only the spousal notification provision. In separate opinions,
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens was especially concerned that the
Missouri law would interfere with the right to use contraceptives such as the IUD and
the morning-after pill. See id. at 563 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
99 137 CONG. REC. S641 (daily ed.Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston); see
also supra text accompanying note 14.
100 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
101 See id. at 2833-38 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
102 See id.
103 SeeBarGroup Votes To Fight Restrictions On Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992,
at A14 ("President Bush opposes abortion"). But see Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Asked
in Personal Context Takes a Softer Stand on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at Al
(reporting that President Bush does not oppose abortion rights for members of his
own family).
104 See Al Kamen, Center-Right Coalition Asserts Itself, WASH. POSTJune 30, 1992,
at Al.
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Justices Blackmun and Stevens provided the fourth and fifth votes
to uphold the Roe framework and to strike the spousal notification
provision. 10 5 Justices Blackmun and Stevens disagreed, however,
with the joint opinion's adoption of the undue burden test. They
advocated the strict scrutiny standard that Roe originally estab-
lished.
10 6
While the celebrated result of Casey is that the Court declined
to overturn Roe, the Court continued to whittle away at the abortion
right in Casey. Applying the undue burden standard, the Court
upheld several provisions designed to discourage women from
exercising their constitutional right to abortion. By a seven to two
margin, the Court upheld the twenty-four hour waiting period
during which Pennsylvania encourages women seeking abortions to
review materials describing the fetus as "an unborn child," irrespec-
tive of their stage of pregnancy. 10 7 By the same margin, the
Court upheld the parental consent requirement-a provision that is
certain to discourage the exercise of the abortion right.'
08
Most importantly, the abortion right itself remains at risk. From
Webster to Casey the number of Justices seeking an intermediate
105 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838-43 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 2843-55 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
106 See id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part). Thus, despite reports to the contrary, see Linda Greenhouse, High
Court Begins Today With Focus on New Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991 at A19
(reporting that in Casey "the Court" adopted the undue burden standard); Linda
Greenhouse, High Cour 54, Affirms Right to Abortion But Allows Most of Pennsylvania's
Limits, N.Y. TIMES,June 30, 1991 at Al (stating that in Casey "the Court said that four
sections of Pennsylvania's law did not impose an undue burden on the right to
abortion"), the Court did not adopt the undue burden standard-only threeJustices did
SO.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices White, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the
Court's judgment insofar as it upheld Pennsylvania's abortion regulations and
dissented insofar as it struck the husband notification provision and certain other
provisions. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). All four dissenters advocated overruling Roe
and adopting a rational basis standard. See id. at 2855, 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
107 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i) (1990).
108 Minors seeking abortions who are required to either consult a parent or seek
permission from ajudge often opt to forgo the abortion. See Hodgson v. Minnesota,
110 S. Ct. 2926, 2953-54 (1990) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Torres et al., Telling
Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12
FAMILY PLAN. PERSP. 284, 289-91 (1980)).
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("undue burden") standard increased from one to three while the
number seeking a strict scrutiny standard decreased from four to
two. The Roe framework survived by only a five to four margin;
Justice Blackmun pointedly reminds us: "I am 83 years old. I
cannot remain on this Court forever."
10 9
2. Congress Responds to Webster and Casey
The Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA)11° would counteract the
Court's holdings in Webster and Casey by prohibiting the states from
restricting the freedom of a woman to choose whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability."11 Under the FOCA,
the states may restrict the abortion right after the point of viability
unless the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
woman.1 12 In case these requirements leave any ambiguity, the
FOCA states that it is the purpose of the bill to "achieve the same
limitations as provided, as a constitutional matter, under the strict
scrutiny standard of review enunciated in Roe v. Wade and applied
in subsequent cases from 1973 to 1988. "11a Moreover, the FOCA
prohibits the states from imposing requirements on the perfor-
mance of abortions unless the requirements are necessary to protect
the health of the woman.
1 14
The FOCA makes two concessions to its goal of protecting the
abortion right. First, it does not apply to issues of public funding
for abortions.1 15 Second, it does not prevent the states from
requiring the consent of a parent, guardian, or other responsible
adult before a minor may obtain an abortion.
11 6
In addition, the FOCA sets forth a number of findings.
According to the bill, Congress finds that recent Supreme Court
decisions on abortion have, inter alia, resulted in physical harm to
women, burdened interstate commerce by forcing people to travel
among the states, interfered with the freedom to travel, burdened
the medical and economic resources of states that do not restrict
the abortion right, and discriminated among people based on their
109 Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
1o S. 25, Version 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
III See id. § 3(a).
112 See id.
113 Id. § 2(b).
114 See id. § 3(a)(3).
115 See id. § 3(b)(2).
116 See id. § 3(b)(3).
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ability to travel (causing disproportionate harm to racial and ethnic
minorities who are generally less able to afford travel). 117 The
FOCA explicitly states its reliance on Congress's section 5 power
(and on the commerce power)1 18 and declares that "[a]lthough
Congress may not by legislation create constitutional rights, it may,
where authorized by its enumerated powers and not prohibited by
a constitutional provision, enact legislation to create and secure
statutory rights in areas of legitimate national concern."
119
C. Equal Protection: Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing
1. McCleskey v. Kemp 120
Warren McCleskey was an African-American man convicted in
Georgia of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder.
He participated in a furniture store robbery in which a European-
American police officer was shot. McCleskey claimed that he was
not the person who shot the officer. But based on evidence linking
the homicide bullets with the gun McCleskey was said to have
carried at the robbery and on testimony that McCleskey admitted to
the crime, the jury found McCleskey guilty of murder. Subsequent-
ly, he was sentenced to death.
121
After an involved journey through state and federal courts,
McCleskey filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. He
claimed that Georgia administered its capital sentencing process in
a racially discriminatory manner and thus violated both the Eighth
Amendment 122 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 123 At the heart of McCleskey's claim was a "sophisti-
cated" statistical study demonstrating that murderers who were of
African descent were more likely to receive the death sentence than
murderers who were of European descent. 124 The study also
showed that those who murder persons of African descent were less
117 See id. § 2.
118 See id. § 2(a)(4).
119 Id. § 2(a)(3).
120 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
121 See id. at 283-85.
122 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
124 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
CAN CONGRESS SAVE US?
likely to receive the death sentence than those who murder persons
of European descent.
125
The Baldus study, as it is known, examined more than 2000
murder cases that occurred in Georgia in the 1970s. 126 The
Supreme Court summarized the results of the study as follows:
[T]he death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving
black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases involving
black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving
white defendants and black victims.
Similarly, Baldus found that prosecutors sought the death
penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white
victims; 32% of the cases involving white defendants and white
victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black
victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims.127
In addressing the Eighth Amendment claim, the district court
concluded that the statistics did not demonstrate a prima facie case
that the state imposed the death penalty on McCleskey because of
his race "or because of any Eighth Amendment concern." 128 With
respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court
concluded the Baldus study was flawed in a number of respects and
thus failed to support McCleskey's claim.
129
The Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Baldus
study was sufficiently valid to show that "the factors of race of the
victim and defendant were at work in Fulton County," where
McCleskey was tried.18 0 Nonetheless, the court of appeals held
that in order to invalidate a capital sentencing system on equal
protection grounds without directly demonstrating a discriminatory
intent, proof of a disparate impact must be so great that it compels
the conclusion that the system is "unprincipled, irrational, arbitrary
and capricious."13 1 The court of appeals therefore affirmed the
district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 Id. at 286-87.
128 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
129 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 372.
'10 McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895, affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
131 Id. at 892.
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The Supreme Court heard the case and, like the court of
appeals, assumed the validity of the Baldus study (although it noted
that the study showed only a risk that the race factor was disposi-
tive).132 The Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision on
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, offered a number of reasons for the holding.
As to the equal protection claim, Justice Powell noted that when
statistics are offered to demonstrate a constitutional violation, they
must demonstrate a "'stark' pattern to be accepted as the sole proof
of discriminatory intent."133 Although this tough standard is not
required in cases alleging discrimination injury selection or in cases
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Justice Powell distinguished those cases
from McCleskey's claim.134 In the former, according to the Court,
there were fewer possible variables relevant to the challenged
decision.13 5 By contrast, the Court averred, in capital sentencing
the Constitution requires "consideration of innumerable factors that
vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and
the facts of the particular capital offense."136 Moreover, the
Court declared, in thejury selection and employment discrimination
cases, the decision maker is given an opportunity to explain the
challenged decision whereas jurors cannot be so questioned.1
3 7
The Court also noted that the enforcement of murder laws is
one of "'society's most basic tasks'"138 and that it would require
"exceptionally clear proof" before it would invalidate capital
sentences as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.139 Finally,
the Court rejected the notion that the Baldus study demonstrated
a discriminatory purpose behind Georgia's capital sentences. Such
a purpose could be proven, according to the Court, only by showing
that the state maintained the death penalty statute because of an
anticipated discriminatory effect.
140
132 See MCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
13 Id. at 293 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
COT., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
l4 See id. at 294-97.
135 See id. at 295.
136 Id. at 294.
137 See id. at 296.
138 Id. at 297 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).
139 Id. at 297.
140 See id. at 297-98. The Court declared that, "[a]t most, the Baldus study
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race" but that "[a]pparent
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2. Congress Responds to McCleskey
The Racial Justice Act (RJA)14' would counteract McCleskey by
prohibiting the state or federal governments from imposing or
executing sentences of death in a racially discriminatory pat-
tern.1 42 The RJA begins by declaring that Congress's section 5
power not only enables it to enact the RJA, but "calls upon
Congress to enforce the Constitution's promise of equality under
the law."143  Moreover, the RJA declares, equality under the law
"is tested most profoundly by whether a legal system tolerates race
playing a role in the determination of whether and when to
administer the ultimate penalty of death."144 The bill recognizes
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." Id. at
312 (emphasis added); cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(declaring that placing minority religions at the mercy of a majoritarian process is the
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government") (emphasis added). As to the
Eighth Amendment claim in McCleskey, the Court concluded that existing Supreme
Court decisions adequately safeguard against the abuse of the death penalty. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissented. Justice Brennan argued that the Baldus study demonstrated a risk of
irrationality in sentencing that violated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 320-21
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the
Baldus study demonstrated a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 361 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). In a third dissent,Justice
Stevens noted that invalidation of McCleskey's sentence based on the Baldus study
would not have invalidated all of Georgia's death sentences, but only those which, like
McCleskey's, fell in the range of the study where race became a statistically significant
factor. According to Stevens, death sentences for extremely serious crimes would not
have been affected had the Court invalidated McCleskey's sentence based on the
Baldus study. See id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
On September 25, 1991, Georgia executed McCleskey. See Peter Applebome,
Georgia Inmate Is Executed After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at
A18. The execution remained uncertain right up until the end because the Supreme
Court again considered the case when twojurors claimed that information improperly
withheld at the trial affected their decision and that they no longer favored the
sentence:
At 2:17 A.M. Mr. McCIeskey was into the electric chair, only to be taken
away three minutes later when officials learned the High Court was still
pondering a stay.
He was placed back in the chair at 2:53 A.M. under the assumption that
no news from the Court meant the execution was still on. Word that the
Court had denied a stay came just as the execution was ready to begin at
3:04.
Id. Prison officials attached the electrodes to McCleskey's head and he was read a
final prayer. At 3:13 Warren McCleskey was pronounced dead. See id.
5fs. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
142 See id. § 3(a).
143 Id. § 2(1).
144 Id. § 2(2).
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the Supreme Court's reluctance to remedy such disparities without
proof that a judge, prosecutor, or jury acted with a discriminatory
intent and finds that Congress is the institutionally appropriate
branch to "take system-wide, preventive measures" under its section
5 power.145 This power, the RJA exclaims, enables Congress to
prevent practices and patterns that "entail an intolerable danger
that persons of different races would be treated differently."
146
The RJA specifies that ordinary statistical proof would be
sufficient to demonstrate a violative pattern and that it would not
be necessary to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose in order to
take advantage of the Act.147  Statistical evidence of a racial
disparity in either the race of defendants or victims would establish
a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 148 To rebut this prima facie case, the govern-
ment would have to show by clear and convincing evidence that
identifiable and pertinent nonracial factors persuasively explain the
racial disparities.
149
The RJA would ensure the existence of information necessary
for its implementation. It would require every federal agency or
state that provides for capital punishment to establish a data
collection system.150 Each system would be required to maintain
standard forms containing information about the race, sex, age, and
national origin of the defendant and list significant aspects of the
case such as mitigating or aggravating factors. 151 State prosecu-
tors would be required to fill out the standard form for every capital
case and transmit the form to the agency.152 Each system would
be required to maintain an adequate index and be available to the
public and to any person charged with a capital offense.
153
As with the RFRA and the FOCA, enactment of the RJA would
create a statutory right to enforce a constitutional right. As such,
the RJA would always be subject to repeal or amendment. But as
already noted, federal laws enforcing constitutional rights tend to
become enshrined in our democracy. As Professor Walter Dellinger
145 Id. § 2(7).
146 Id.
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points out, it is hard to imagine Congress tampering with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or the Voting Rights Act of 1965.154 This
argument has special force as applied to the RJA because of the
extreme repugnance of executing people based on their race and
the close relationship such executions bear to the history of the
Civil War Amendments.
155
II. CONGRESS'S POWER TO ENFORCE AND EXPAND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Historical Background of Congressional Power
The congressional efforts to overcome Smith, Webster, Casey and
McCleskey raise the question of whether Congress has the power to
prohibit conduct which the Court has said does not violate the
Constitution. The view that the legislature should independently
determine the constitutionality of legislation comports with the
Madisonian vision of three coequal branches of government, each
"charged with protecting the Constitution in its own delibera-
tions." 156 In fact, the "prevailing view of those serving in early
Congresses was that Congress, as an independent branch of
government, had both an independent authority and duty to decide
constitutional questions."
157
Several of our nation's early leaders shared Madison's conviction
that the three branches of government are coequal. For example,
in a letter to Abigail Adams defending his remission of punishments
under the Alien and Sedition Acts, Thomas Jefferson asserted the
following:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the
validity of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has
154 See Letter from Professor Dellinger, supra note 76.
155 See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877, at 184-98
(1990) (contending that the Civil War Amendments and accompanying enforcement
statutes were designed to quell the Ku Klux Klan's murderous campaign against
African-Americans and their defenders in the Reconstruction South).
156 Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV.
311,313 (1987) (citing DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 47-48
(1966)). To be sure, Madison thought that "'in the ordinary course of Government,
... the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon thejudiciary.'" Id. at
313 n.10 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). Yet, as a
member of the House of Representatives, Madison reminded his colleagues of their
duty "'so far as it depends upon us, to take care that the powers of the Constitution
be preserved.'" Id.157 Id. (citing DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTrUTIoN 47 (1966)).
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given them a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the
Executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally
independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. Thejudges,
believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of
fine and imprisonment; because the power was placed in their
hands by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the law to
be unconstitutional, were bound to remit the execution of it;
because that power has been confided to them by the Constitution.
That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be
checks on each other.
58
Andrew Jackson declared an even stronger view in vetoing a bill to
recharter the Bank of the United States:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be
guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.... The opinion
of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the
opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the
president is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme
Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress
or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to
have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may
deserve.
159
In his 1858 campaign for the Senate, Abraham Lincoln argued that
Congress should nullify the Court's decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,160 which had declared the Missouri Compromise uncon-
stitutional: "'If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on
a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory,
in spite of that Dred Scott Decision, I would vote that it
should.'" 16 1 Lincoln repeated this theme in his 1861 inaugural
address, stating that if government policy on "'vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of
158 11 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50-51 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904), quoted in
Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57,67 (1986);see also Louis Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretation
by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 711-12 (1985) (stating that Jefferson's
constitutional theory envisioned the three branches as coequals with complete
independence).
IC Brest, supra note 158, at 67-68 (quoting 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 576, 581-82 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)); see also, Fisher, supra note 158, at
712-14 (describing Jackson's theory of the three branches as having limits that
Jefferson's theory does not recognize).
160 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
161 Brest, supra note 158, at 77 (quoting A. LINcOLN: HIs SPEECHES AND WRITING
385, 396 (R. Basler ed., 1969)).
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the Supreme Court... the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers.
' " 162
It was not until 1890 that members of Congress manifested a
propensity for deferring constitutional questions to the judicial
branch. In that year a leading proponent of an antitrust bill
declared that the only way to determine the legislation's constitu-
tionality was to refer it to the Supreme Court.163 By the time of
the Great Depression, the view that Congress should refer constitu-
tional questions to the Supreme Court was well established and it
has remained so ever since.
164
Despite general congressional deference to Supreme Court
determinations of constitutionality, the Court has recognized that
Congress has the power to give constitutional rights greater scope
than the Court gives those rights absent congressional action.
Matters concerning the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments fall into this category. These provisions, known as the
"Civil War Amendments," were added to the Constitution during
Reconstruction and were expressly designed to enhance the power
of the federal government while restricting the power of the
states.
165
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery, and the Fifteenth
Amendment guarantees all citizens the right to vote. The remaining
Civil War Amendment, the Fourteenth, contains five sections;
sections 1 and 5 are directly relevant to this Comment. Section 1
protects the "privileges or immunities" of citizens, prohibits the
states from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law," and directs that the states deny no
person "the equal protection of the laws." 166 Thus, section 1
provides individuals with three protections against the states:
guarantees as to privileges or immunities, due process, and equal
protection. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."16 7 The Thirteenth and
162 Fisher, supra note 158, at 715 (quoting 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 159, at 3210).
163 See Ross, supra note 156, at 313-14 n.10 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2608 (1890)
(remarks of Senator Washburn)).
164 See id. at 314 n.10.
165 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (1991).
166 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167 Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Fifteenth Amendments also conclude with enforcement provisions
that are nearly identical to section 5.168
The RJA, the FOCA, and the RFRA all depend upon one or
more of the substantive guarantees of section 1. For example, the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits unequal treatment based on
race,1 69 thus providing a Fourteenth Amendment right which the
RJA would enforce. Similarly, the right to have an abortion is a
liberty right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause (at least as long as Roe continues to be good law), 170 thus
providing a Fourteenth Amendment right which the FOCA would
enforce. Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause applies to
gender discrimination, albeit to a lesser extent than to situations
involving race. 17 1 The Equal Protection Clause thus provides an
additional Fourteenth Amendment basis for the FOCA. Finally,
because the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applies to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 172 the RFRA could be said to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process.
Yet, in order to enact any of these bills, Congress must give
force to constitutional rights beyond the perimeters of those rights
as defined by the Court. As we shall see, Congress has broad power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and such legislation
is not unprecedented. In addition, Congress has broad power
under the nearly identical enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court has held the Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power to be coextensive with the section
5 power; 173 and there is no reason to believe that cases interpret-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment are not equally applicable to section
5.
168 See id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2.
169 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that
segregation in public schools denies children ofAfrican descent the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
170 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
171 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (noting that the ability of females to
purchase nonintoxicating beer at a younger age than males is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause-ofthe Fourteenth Amendment); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1972) (holding that denying an otherwise qualified male
admission to an all-female school of nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
172 See supra note 30.
173 See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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B. The Beginnings: Ex Parte Virginia
In one of the earliest cases interpreting Congress's power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments, Ex Parte Virginia,174 the
Court upheld a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that made it
a crime for state officials to exclude any citizen from serving as a
juror on account of the citizen's race, color or previous condition
of servitude.1 75 This legislation created a sword for persons
discriminatorily excluded from juries, whereas the Constitution had
provided only a shield for defendants against prosecution in a court
with a discriminatorily chosen jury.176  The Court, echoing its
broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
McCulloch v. Maryland,177 stated that "[w]hatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amend-
ments have in view.... is brought within the domain of congressio-
nal power."178 Writing for the majority, Justice Strong empha-
sized that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments explicitly
give Congress the power to enforce their provisions179 and that the
Constitution authorizes "congressional interference and compulsion
in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment."
180
The Court's Fourteenth Amendment holding in Ex Parte Virginia
has remained firm.18 1  Additionally, the Court's Thirteenth
Amendment holding, although at one time limited by the Civil
174 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
175 See id. at 349 (upholding the Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-4, 18 Stat. 336
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988))).
176 This "shield" aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment was upheld in Strauderv.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
177 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress authority to enact laws aimed at carrying out the powers granted to it by the
unamended body of the Constitution. The clause reads: "The Congress shall have
Power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. In a famous opinion written by Chiefjustice John Marshall, the
Court held in McCulloch that Congress had the constitutional authority to create a
bank because creating a bank was a necessary and proper means for executing the
specifically enumerated congressional duties of raising revenue, collecting taxes,
borrowing money, and regulating commerce. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
422-23.178 Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46.
179 See id. at 347.
180 See id. at 348.
181 See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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Rights Cases,1 82 was reestablished in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 183 and has since gone undisturbed. In the Civil Rights Cases
the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of
slavery restricts both private and governmental action.18 4 Howev-
er, in striking down a law prohibiting race discrimination in public
accommodations, the Court limited Congress's ability to define and
remedy the badges of slavery.1 85 InJones the Court removed that
limitation, upholding a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that
prohibits race discrimination in private transactions involving
property, 186 and declaring that Congress can define and remedy
"the badges and the incidents of slavery."
187
Yet the Court has never held that the Thirteenth Amendment
itself does "anything more than abolish slavery." 188 For example,
in Palmer v. Thompson1 89 the Court rejected a Thirteenth Amend-
ment challenge to a city's decision to close its public swimming
pools rather than comply with a desegregation order. In Palmer, the
18 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
183 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
184 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
185 See id. at 22-25.
186 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
187 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440. The Court inJones noted that under its commerce
power Congress could prohibit and remedy most forms of private discrimination by
enacting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 441 n.78 (citing Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the enforcement of a congressional prohibition against
racial discrimination in the context of a restaurant); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding a congressional prohibition of racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation)). The Court thought this
rendered its discussion somewhat "academic." Id. But when Congress drafted the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,Jones had not yet been decided and Congress faced a dual
obstacle presented by the Civil Rights Cases-an inability to define the badges of
slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment and a state action requirement under the
Fourteenth Amendment. After much discussion and controversy, Congress based
Title II on the commerce power rather than on the enforcement powers of the Civil
War Amendments. Jones overruled the Thirteenth Amendment holding of the Civil
Rights Cases, but the state action doctrine is still good law. Remarkably, new historical
research shows that in the 1960s, the Court was ready to overturn the state action
doctrine and thus give Congress the ability to prohibit private sector discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Neil H. MacBride, Note, The Politics of Public
Accommodations: The Searchfora Constitutional Basisfor Title II, 8J.L. & POL. 437,439,
467 (describing the debate over whether to base Title II on § 5 or on the Commerce
Clause and arguing that the Supreme Court was prepared to uphold Title II on the
§ 5 power).
88 Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1980).
189 403 U.S. 217 (1970).
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Court explicitly referred the problem to Congress to address under
its enforcement power:
[A]Ithough the Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of
words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the
operation of swimming pools throughout the length and breadth
of this Nation, the Amendment does contain other words that we
held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could empower Congress to
outlaw badges of slavery.
190
So, in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court readily
accepts congressional power to prohibit conduct that does not itself
violate the Constitution.
1 91
C. The Modern Trend: The Voting Rights Cases
The modern conception of Congress's power under the Civil
War Amendments emerged in the 1960s in a series of cases
involving conflicts over federal voting-rights laws. Like Ex Parte
Virginia, these cases interpret Congress's powers very broadly. The
first of these cases was a Fifteenth Amendment case, South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,192 in which the Court upheld a section of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that temporarily suspended literacy tests
in states or political subdivisions with less than fifty percent voter
registration. 93 Yet in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections,194 the Court had held that a state may, consistent with
the Fifteenth Amendment, condition the right of suffrage on
literacy tests. In South Carolina, the Court noted that Lassiter had
left open the possibility that a literacy test, fair on its face, might be
unfairly administered and held that such was the situation in the
case before it.195 More broadly, the Court held that Congress's
power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment was the same
19o Id. at 227.
191 In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Court reaffirmed this principle
by upholding a statute that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and
enforcing of contracts. Even the dissenters in Runyon did not question "the power
of Congress" to prohibit private discrimination in the making of contracts; the
dissenters simply thought that the statute at issue was not designed to reach private
discrimination. See id. at 192 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). In Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Court declined an opportunity to overrule
Runyon.
192 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
19" See id. at 323 (upholding the Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79
Stat. 437, 438 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1988))).
194 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
'95 See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 333.
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as Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
196
and quoted Justice Marshall's famous test from McCulloch: "'Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and the
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.'
19 7
In City of Rome v. United States,198 the Court again illuminated
Congress's broad powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. The Court held that Congress could prohibit electoral
schemes with discriminatory effects, 199 even though it held on the
same day in City of Mobile v. Bolden,200 that such schemes do not
of themselves violate the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, declared that "Congress may prohibit
practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the
Amendment"20 1 and identified the "appropriate" test of McCulloch
and Ex Parte Virginia as the relevant measure of congressional
power.
202
Shortly after South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court decided
Katzenbach v. Morgan,203 generally recognized as the Court's most
deferential treatment of congressional power under the Civil War
Amendments.20 4 Although Morgan was a voting rights case, the
Court did not rely on the Fifteenth Amendment but rather on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in
Morgan was section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act,20 5 which invali-
dated New York State's literacy test as applied to persons who had
196 See id. at 326; see also Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 287 (1969)
(relying on South Carolina to hold that a county could not reinstate its literacy tests
against the congressional prohibition).
197 South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
198 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
I99 id. at 179.
200 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
201 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177.
202 See id. City of Rome also verified that the enforcement powers of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are coextensive. The majority relied on
Fourteenth Amendment cases. See id. at 176-77, 179-80. Even though he dissented,
then-Justice Rehnquist agreed that "the nature of the enforcement powers conferred
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coexten-
sive." See id. at 207 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
204 See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1229 (1978).
205 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1988).
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completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rican schools. The Court held
that Congress could, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, invalidate such tests as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. 20 6 Additionally, the Court held that, as with the Fifteenth
Amendment, the standard of McCulloch is to be applied in determin-
ing what constitutes appropriate legislation: "§ 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
20 7
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, offered two
rationales for its broad holding. First, the Court suggested that
Congress could have intended to enhance Puerto Ricans' political
power in order to help them gain nondiscriminatory treatment
throughout society. 20 8  Under this rationale, it is the general
discriminatory treatment (rather than the literacy test) that violates
the Equal Protection Clause; the congressional grant to Puerto
Ricans of greater voting rights helps them secure all other rights.
Alternatively, the Court asserted that Congress, contrary to the
Court in Lassiter, could have found that the literacy test itself
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 9 This was a profound
definition of congressional power. This rationale-the "second
Morgan rationale"-holds that Congress can expressly disagree with
the Court as to the reach of constitutional rights. The second
Morgan rationale raises fundamental constitutional issues. For the
Court to pay such deference to congressional determinations might
be seen as endangering the fundamental constitutional principle of
Marbury v. Madison210 that the judiciary has the last word in
interpreting the Constitution: "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 211 Addi-
tionally, as Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Morgan, if
Congress has the power to expand the scope of constitutional rights,
then it would seem to follow that Congress also has the power to
206 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658.
207 Id. at 651.
208 See id. at 652.
209 See id. at 653-56.
210 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
211 Id. at 177. In Marbury, the Court invalidated the Judiciary Act of 1789 because
it gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus for federal
officeholders. The Court thought that the Constitution did not give Congress the
authority to grant jurisdiction of this sort to the Supreme Court. See id. at 176-80.
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restrict rights.212 However, the majority responded in a footnote
that the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment does not
include the power to "restrict, abrogate or dilute" its guaran-
tees. 2
13
D. The Ratchet Theory
The majority's proposition in Morgan that Congress can expand
but not contract Fourteenth Amendment rights has become known
as the one-way "ratchet" theory.214 This section examines three
scholarly defenses of the theory in order to better explain how
Congress can expand constitutional rights where the Court has
declined to do so.
The first defense is linguistic and maintains that the word
"enforce" in the Fourteenth Amendment means "expand but not
contract." 215 Professor Lawrence Sager has observed that this
explanation is somewhat problematic because it ignores the
possibility that in expanding the Fourteenth Amendment for one
group Congress might be contracting it for another.216 For
example, if the Court were to hold that affirmative action programs
violate white persons' equal protection rights, a congressional
attempt to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause by expanding the
rights of racial minorities through affirmative action would at the
same time restrict the equal protection rights of the racial majori-
ty.217  Such a tug of war between Congress and the Court is
precisely what the Morgan dissenters feared.
However, this problem can be solved by interpreting the ratchet
theory to require the invalidation of any restriction on constitutional
212 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, the idea of
allowing Congress to restrict rights may have been more appealing tojustice Harlan
as a tool of argumentation than as an idea he was willing to embrace. WhenJustice
Harlan was faced with an opportunity to approve congressional power to restrict the
establishment right, he went out of his way to repair a statute so as to cure the
potential congressional restriction. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-67
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); see also infra note 411.
213 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
214 See, e.g., Sager, supra note 204, at 1230.
215 See id. at 1231-32.
216 See id. at 1231.
217 As Justice Kennedy put it, "[t]he process by which a law that is an equal
protection violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal
protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me."
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,518 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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rights.218 In other words, if the Court were to hold affirmative
action programs unconstitutional then Congress cannot enact
affirmative action programs. Were this not so, Congress could, for
example, enforce the rights of women by restricting the free speech
rights of anti-abortion demonstrators; enforce the rights of fetuses
and embryos (assuming it could define the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's meaning of "persons") by restricting the rights of women; or
enforce the rights of racial minorities who are victims of hate crimes
by restricting suspects' rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The whole purpose of the ratchet theory is to prohibit the
restriction of rights. That Congress is acting under the enforcement
powers of the Civil War Amendments gives it no more ability to
restrict rights than if it were acting under any other of its enumerat-
ed powers. The undoing of some Supreme Court decisions-those
restricting one individual right while expanding another individual
right-will simply have to await another Court. While this solution
will render Congress powerless to remedy certain injustices, it is the
only solution consistent with the structure and purpose of constitu-
tional liberties; those liberties are designed to prevent a tyranny of
the majority.
219
A second defense of the ratchet theory is the federalism/
personal liberties distinction as articulated by Professor William
Cohen.220 This theory holds that when Congress expands rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment it is encroaching upon state
authority. However, judicial action is not thought to be the
appropriate response to this encroachment. This defense holds that
while the judiciary must be called upon to safeguard individual
liberties, the political process is the proper mechanism for prevent-
ing and correcting congressional usurpations of state power. The
judiciary should trust that the political process will prevent
legislative overreaching in matters of states' rights, according to this
theory, because the legislature itself is made up of representatives
218 See S. REP. No. 321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1992) (arguing that the Human
Life Bill introduced in the 97th Congress would have violated the ratchet effect by
restricting the rights of women).
219 See supra text accompanying note 69.
220 See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 613 (1975). Professor Herbert Wechsler was the first
to expound this theory. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Wechsler argued that "Congress acts ... against the
background of the total corpus juris of the states ... assumed to govern unless
changed by [national] legislation." Id. at 545.
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from each of the states, who will look out for state interests. On the
other hand, the theory concludes, when Congress restricts Four-
teenth Amendment rights it is encroaching upon individual liberties,
and the Court should not defer such issues to a majoritarian body,
which is inherently less likely to protect individual rights.2 21
Recent cases addressing Congress's power to execute the
Commerce Clause seem to support the federalism/personal liberties
distinction. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authoi-
ty, 222 a case that presented a contest between Congress's com-
merce power and the Tenth Amendment power of the states, the
Court adopted the federalism/personal liberties distinction.
223
Specifically, it held that Congress could prescribe a minimum wage
for state government employees. This holding directly overruled
National League of Cities v. Usery,224 in which the Court had held
that a federal law setting the wages of state employees unconstitu-
tionally interfered with "the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
225
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Garcia, claimed that
the Court need not intervene on behalf of state interests because
state interests are amply protected by the political safeguards
inherent in the federal constitutional scheme. 226 For example,
the Court noted, the states are guaranteed equal representation in
the Senate and the states exercise indirect control over the House
of Representatives and the President by controlling electoral
qualifications.
227
Despite the High Court's acceptance of the federalism/ personal
liberties distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court's
attraction to this theory may prove to be rather ephemeral. Garcia
was decided by a bare five to four majority, and in his dissent, then-
Justice Rehnquist practically promised to overturn the decision at
221 See Sager, supra note 204, at 1236.
222 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
223 See id. at 550 ("[Tlhe principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role
of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself.").
224 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
225 Id. at 852.
226 See id.; see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding that the
denial of the federal income tax exemption for interest on bonds issued by state and
local governments did not violate the Tenth Amendment because the state had not
shown it was deprived of any right to participate in the national political process).
227 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51.
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his earliest opportunity.228  Given the Court's current composi-
tion, its approval of the federalism/personal liberties distinction
stands on precariously fragile ground.229 It is possible that the
Court will reject the theory in favor of Justice Powell's interpreta-
tion of federalism. In his dissent in Garcia, Justice Powell asserted
that a number of developments over the course of the twentieth
century, including the direct election of senators, the weakening of
the political parties at the local level, and the rise of national media,
have made Congress less sensitive to state and local interests and
more responsive to national constituencies. 230 To his credit,
Justice Powell alone argued for consistency in the Court's treatment
of state interests and individual rights: "[o]ne can hardly imagine
this Court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals,
individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply
protected by the political process."
231
In spite of Justice Powell's inability to imagine it, that is exactly
what the Court is now saying. In Employment Division v. Smith,
232
the Court explicitly held that the democratic process provides all the
protection of religious liberty that is needed against generally
applicable, religion-neutral laws. Similarly, in McCleskey v.
Kemp,233 the Court was explicit in referring an alleged equal
protection violation to "legislative bodies" under the assumption
that these bodies are sufficiently able to safeguard individual
rights.234 The Court's view that individual rights are amply
protected by the political process is directly contrary to the
argument of Professor Cohen and Justice Powell that individual
rights must be protected by the judiciary because majoritarian
228 See id. at 580 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those
of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.").
229 Some people expected the Court to overrule Garcia last term in New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4
(statement of Professor Ira Lupu at 13-14). This the Court declined to do, although
it did resurrect the Tenth Amendment in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Court did so, however, without resorting to-the "traditional government functions"
analysis of National League of Cities and without disparaging the federalism/personal
liberties distinction. See infra text accompanying notes 346-49; cf. Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
an opinion which several members of the Court had previously sought to overturn).2 0See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565-66 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 565 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
233 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
234 See id. at 319.
1993] 1065
1066 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 141:1029
bodies are insensitive to the concerns of individuals. Should the
Court overrule Garcia and adoptJustice Powell's view that the Court
must actively protect states' interests, it will have come full circle.
It will have gone from holding that the legislative process protects
state interests (Garcia) but not individual rights (e.g., Sherbert) to
holding that the legislative process protects individual rights (e.g.,
Smith) but not state interests (Garcia overruled).
Even if the Court takes this route and completely discards the
federalism/personal liberties distinction in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, it would not necessarily bode ill for congressional
attempts to enforce individual rights. The Court specifically noted
in National League of Cities v. Usery23 5 that its limitation on the
commerce power does not control questions of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 6 As we shall
see in greater detail, the Court has explicitly stated that "Congress
is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that
circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers."
23 7
This is as it should be-for unlike the Commerce Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment followed the adoption of the Tenth
Amendment and was part of a great historical shift in power from
the states to the national government.238 So the ratchet theory
makes perfect sense in Fourteenth Amendment cases: when
Congress expands rights it is serving the purpose of the Civil War
Amendments to protect individual rights by curtailing the states'
power; when Congress attempts to restrict rights it is unlawfully
undermining that purpose.
The third defense of the ratchet theory is based on the superior
factfinding capability of Congress as compared to the judiciary.
239
Justice Brennan expounded this theory in Oregon v. Mitchell,240 in
which the Court upheld Congress's nationwide extension of the ban
on literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting241 despite the Court's
235 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
236 See id. at 852 n.17.
237 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983); see infra notes 291-321 and
accompanying text.
238 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (1991); see also infra notes 289-
92 and accompanying text.
239 See Sager, supra note 204, at 1232-35.
240 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
241 See id. at 118 (upholding the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, § 201, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1988))).
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previous holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elec-
tions242 that conditioning the suffrage right on literacy tests does
not violate the Constitution. The factfinding defense sees the
controversy over congressional power in terms of a contest between
state and federal legislative bodies. Because of the Supremacy
Clause, the Court must defer to federal legislative choices over state
legislative choices. Additionally, this defense contends, the Court
should defer to congressional choices over the Court's own
interpretations when Congress is able to "unearth new evidence in
its investigation."
243
Professor Sager criticizes the factfinding defense as insufficient
to support the ratchet theory because the courts are unlikely to
change their holdings in response to congressional factfinding.
244
According to Professor Sager, the factfinding defense assumes "a
legislative superiority in factfinding which is not self-evident."
245
Yet this does not seem right. Compared to the Court, Congress is
a more appropriate institution for investigating widespread social
problems such as racial, gender, and religious inequality, and for
devising solutions to those problems. The Court can only consider
the facts contained in the record and the issues presented in the
case before it. Individual cases do not present the Court with a full
picture of widespread societal problems or with the full range of
solutions to such problems. By contrast, Congress's consideration
of factual and constitutional issues is confined only by the limits of
its investigative zeal: Congress can hold hearings, collect informa-
tion, and subpoena witnesses ad infinitum.
Granted, as Justice Harlan stressed in his dissent in Oregon v.
Mitchell, the decisions Congress makes based on its factual investiga-
tions are moral in dimension:246 whether Puerto Ricans who have
completed the sixth grade should have the right to vote regardless
of their facility with English; whether literacy tests should be
eliminated nationwide; whether women should have the right to an
abortion; whether racial disparities in capital sentencing should be
tolerated; whether government should burden religious conduct
without a compelling state interest-these are clearly normative
questions. But the fact that the ultimate decisions are normative
242 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
243 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 249 n.31 (Brennan, J.).
244 See Sager, supra note 204, at 1234.
241 Id. at 1233.
246 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 206 (Harlan, J.).
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does not mean that Congress is not institutionally appropriate for
answering these questions. In Employment Division v. Smith, the
Court explicitly referred this normative process to the legislative
branch.247 In Mitchell, Justice Harlan also shared this confidence
in the legislative process: "I fully agree that judgments of the sort
involved here are beyond the institutional competence and
constitutional authority of the judiciary."248 Justice Harlan simply
thought that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect voting
rights.249 In fact, in his Morgan dissent, Justice Harlan depended
heavily on Congress's ability to determine "legislative facts"250 in
distinguishing South Carolina. Justice Harlan had joined the Court's
holding in South Carolina because there was a "'voluminous
legislative history,'" 251 to demonstrate the pernicious effects of
literacy tests on voting rights. ButJustice Harlan cited as a reason
for his dissent in Morgan that Congress had provided the Court with
"no such factual data."252  Thus, absent the state control of
electoral qualifications he so desired, even Justice Harlan points us
toward Congress as the appropriate branch to address widespread
discriminatory practices.
The three defenses of the ratchet theory explain how it is that
the Constitution allows Congress to expand but not contract
Fourteenth Amendment rights. All three defenses retain some
vitality. The linguistic defense reminds us that to "enforce" rights
one cannot restrict rights. The federalism/personal liberties
distinction embodies the notion that federalism concerns do not
restrain Congress's power under the Civil War Amendments
because those provisions were expressly designed to protect
individual rights and to curtail states rights. Finally, the factfinding
defense avers that Congress is a more appropriate institution than
the .Court for investigating and remedying widespread violations of
rights.
The ratchet effect might seem like an unfair means of approach-
ing the Constitution because it gives Congress such one-sided
power. But it is not unfair if the structure, purpose, and intent of
the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments is to protect
247 See 494 U.S. 872, 889-90 & n.5 (1990).
248 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 206-07 (Harlan, J.).
249 See id. at 200 (Harlan, J.).
250 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 667 (HarlanJ., dissenting) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 309 (1966)).
252 Id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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individual liberty.253 By ensuring that Congress can help protect
individual rights but by preventing Congress from weakening those
rights, the ratchet effect is completely consistent with the intent of
the Framers and the purposes of the constitutional protections of
individual liberty.
E. The Principle of Marbury v. Madison: Cooper,
Baker, and Powell
As noted above, critics of the ratchet theory and the second
Morgan rationale-that Congress can independently discern and
remedy violations of constitutional rights-believe that Morgan
endangers the fundamental principle established in Marbuy v.
Madison that the Court is the ultimate expositor of the Constitution.
In addition to Marbuty, three other cases are sometimes cited as
establishing sweeping declarations of the Court's power over acts of
Congress. However, analysis of these cases shows that they are
plainly inapplicable to cases addressing the constitutionality of acts
of Congress.
The first case is Cooper v. Aaron,254 in which the Court cited
Marbury and stated "[t]his decision declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system." 255 However, Cooper should
not be interpreted as establishing a limitation on Congress because
Cooper did not involve a contest between Congress and the Court.
Rather, Cooper involved a contest between a state that refused to
comply with a school desegregation order and the federal courts'
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
256
The second case is Baker v. Carr,257 in which the Court stated:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpreta-
253 See supra text accompanying note 69.
2 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2 Id. at 18 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)), quoted
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 n.86 (1970) (Harlan, J.).
256 See id. at 4.
257 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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tion, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.
258
Like Cooper, Baker was not a case involving a contest between
Congress and the Court. Rather, as an apportionment case, Baker
involved a contest between state power over legislative apportion-
ment and the federal courts' power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.259 The above quoted statement in Baker was simply dicta-
the Court followed the statement with the conclusion that cases
interpreting the division of power between branches of the federal
government did not apply to the situation in Baker.260 So Baker
does not establish any limits on congressional power.
In Powell v. McCormack,261 the Court cited Baker for the propo-
sition that "it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."2 62 Like Cooper and Baker, Powell
also did not involve a contest between Congress and the Court.
Powell involved a contest between the Court and a resolution of the
House of Representatives. 263 No duly enacted statute was at issue
and for that reason Congress's section 5 power also was not at issue.
Thus, whatever the force of Cooper, Baker, and Powell, these cases
do not apply to the issue of congressional power. If one searches
the cases, sweeping declarations of legislative power can be found
in equally irrelevant cases. For example, in Missour4 Kansas & Texas
Railway v. May, no less a jurist than Oliver Wendell Holmes
declared that "it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great
a degree as the courts." 264 Yet May, like Cooper, Baker, and Powell,
presented a contest between state and federal power rather than a
question of congressional power. In order to grasp the Court's
treatment of congressional power, it is necessary to consider cases
addressing that power.
258 Id. at 211.
259 See id. at 196.
260 Id. at 226.
261 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
262 Id. at 549 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
265 See id. at 492-93.
264 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (upholding against an equal protection challenge a
state law directed solely against railroad companies).
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F. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts Concur
As in the voting rights cases, in comparatively recent cases the
Court has continued to recognize the broad nature of Congress's
power. For example, in Fullilove v. Klutznik 265 the Court upheld
a federal law setting aside ten percent of construction grants for
racial minorities. Chief Justice Burger's opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court stated that Congress acted within its section
5 power in that it could have determined that prevailing procure-
ment practices perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination:
266
Here we deal ... not with the limited remedial powers of a
federal court, for example, but with the broad remedial powers of
Congress. It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state
or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial
power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution
with competence and authority to enforce equal protection
guarantees.
267
Similarly, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC268 the Court upheld
Congress's power to prevent future discrimination, without a
finding of past discrimination, through the use of benign race-
conscious measures. Even Justice O'Connor's dissent, which stated
that section 5 was simply not relevant to a case involving federal
agencies, recognized that some benign race-conscious measures are
a valid exercise of Congress's section 5 power:269 "Congress has
considerable latitude, presenting special concerns for judicial
review, when it exercises its 'unique remedial powers under section
5 .... ,"270 Justice O'Connor distinguished City of Richmond v.
JA. Croson27 1 in which the Court had invalidated a municipal plan
identical to the congressionally created scheme upheld in
Fullilove.272 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Croson stated
that "[t]he power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power
to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles
215 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
26 See id. at 478 (plurality opinion). The opinion also noted, however, that
Congress employed "an amalgam" of its powers, including the spending power and
the commerce power. Id. at 473.267 Id. at 483.
268 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
269 See id. at 3030-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270 Id. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 488 (1990)).
271 488 U.S. 469 (1990).
272 See id. at 491.
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of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those
situations."273
G. Oregon v. Mitchell: Does it Limit Morgan?
Oregon v. Mitchell274 has been referred to as the case in which
the Supreme Court upheld Congress's extension of the ban on
literacy tests for voting to the whole nation. Mitchell has also been
referred to as the source ofJustice Brennan's factfinding defense of
the ratchet theory. But another aspect of Mitchell is viewed by some
as a limitation on Congress's power under Morgan.275 In fact, at
congressional hearings on the FOCA, the Justice Department
submitted a memorandum to Congress describing Mitchell as
undercutting the second rationale of Morgan.
2 7 6
In Mitchell, the Court unanimously upheld the ban on literacy
tests but was badly split on other aspects of the challenged legisla-
tion: in five different opinions the Court upheld by a five to four
margin a provision lowering the voting age to eighteen in federal
elections and the Court struck, by the same margin, a provision
lowering the voting age to eighteen in state elections.2 77 The
holdings and opinions in Mitchell are crucial to understanding the
scope of Congress's section 5 power because that case presented the
question whether Congress can prohibit conduct that discriminates
against classes of people, such as the aged, whom the Court affords
only the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny.
278
273 Id. at 490.
274 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
275 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("I
have always read Oregon v. Mitchell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to
which Congress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states .... ").
276 See The Freedom of Choice Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the House
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter
1992 FOCA Hearings] (forthcoming 1993) (unpublished statements and memorandum
on file with author) (memorandum of law appended to the statement of Timothy E.
Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice at 21) (citing
Mitchell for the proposition that "[l]ater developments in the law have undercut
Morgan as authority for a non-remedial reading of section 5"); see also id. (unpublished
statement of Professor Douglas W. Kmiec at 19 n.7) ("[Mitchell] is widely accepted as
rejecting any expansive claim that section 5 empowers Congress to define constitu-
tional guarantees.").
277 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117-18 (Black, J.).
278 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (applying the rational basis test in an
equal protection challenge to age discrimination); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (same). That Mitchell preceded these
cases does not have great significance, for the Court has never applied heightened
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In Mitchell, four Justices (in opinions by Justices Harlan and
Stewart) thought both provisions relating to age were unconstitu-
tional, fourJustices (in opinions by Justices Douglas and Brennan)
thought both provisions were constitutional, and Justice Black
thought that the provision relating to federal office-holders was
constitutional but the provision relating to state office-holders was
unconstitutional. Thus, the Court upheld the voting age for federal
elections and struck down the voting age for state elections.
279
As to the holding regarding federal elections, four Justices
believed that Congress could find that age discrimination violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 280 Justice Black sidestepped the
Fourteenth Amendment question; he believed that a separate
constitutional provision, article I, section 4,281 gave Congress the
authority to set the voting age.282 Thus, although the holding as
to federal elections suggests that Congress can find age discrimina-
tion violative of the Equal Protection Clause, only four Justices so
reasoned.
As to the voting age in state elections, the four dissenters on the
federal elections issue became part of the new majority. Three
Justices believed that Congress cannot remedy age discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause, 283 and Justice Harlan believed
that Congress could not address voting rights issues under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 28 4 Justice Black cast his vote with these four,
but in a cagey opinion left open the possibility that Congress could
find and remedy age discrimination or other equal protection
violations which the Court had not previously recognized as within
the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.
scrutiny to age discrimination.
279 Following Mitchell, the Twenty-sixth Amendment, guaranteeing citizens
eighteen years of age or older the right to vote in state and federal elections, was
added to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
280 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 141-44 (Douglas,J.); id. at 280-81 (Brennan,J.) (joined
by White and Marshall, J1.).
281 "The Times, Places, Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
fives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
282 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 119 (Black, J.).
283 See id. at 296 (StewartJ.).
284 See id. at 200, 212-13 (Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan's opinion suggests that he
also believed that Congress could not remedy age discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause. But Justice Harlan did not reach the age issue because he
reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment does not affect voting rights no matter
which class of persons is at issue. See id.
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Justice Black thought that article I, section 2, in conjunction
with the Tenth Amendment and the "whole Constitution," reserves
to states the power to set qualifications for voters in state and local
elections. 28 5 Because Congress had attempted to "invade an area
preserved to the States by the Constitution"28 6 without making
any legislative findings that the legislation was needed to remedy
discrimination based on race, Justice Black reasoned that the section
5 enforcement power had to give way to the constitutional reserva-
tions of state power. Justice Black thus seemed to be the fifth
Justice in favor of tying the Equal Protection Clause to racial
discrimination. However, he added an important caveat: "On the
other hand, where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved
by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so
closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race."
287
Essentially, Justice Black believed there were federalism barriers to
Congress only when addressing forms of discrimination other than
race discrimination.
So if Mitchell does represent a limitation, it is only a limitation
on Congress's ability to remedy non-racial discrimination in
situations where the Tenth Amendment or other constitutional
provisions reserve power to the states. Yet, to extract even this
limitation from Mitchell is a stretch requiring a least common
denominator approach. Only three (at most four) Justices argued
that Congress cannot prohibit age discrimination under its power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 8 That contention was
flatly contradicted by the four Justices who said that Congress can
set the age limits in both federal and state elections under its
section 5 power. The question whether Congress can remedy age
discrimination under its section 5 power was thus at best a tie. Any
limitation on the section 5 power in Mitchell must therefore depend
on the federalism argument presented by just one Justice. More-
over, since Mitchell the Court has specifically rejected federalism
limitations on Congress's enforcement powers under the Civil War
Amendments.
285 See id. at 124-26 (Black, J.).
286 Id. at 130 (opinion of Black, J.).
287 Id.
288 See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
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H. Federalism: The Tenth and Eleventh Amendments-No Barrier
to Congress's Power
1. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
The alleged limitation of Mitchell appears similar to the
limitation on Congress's Commerce Clause power in National League
of Cities, the case overruled in Garcia. Both National League of Cities
and Justice Black's opinion in Mitchell claim that certain state
functions are inviolate as a matter of the Tenth Amendment and
principles of federalism. But when Congress legislates under the
enforcement power of the Civil War Amendments, the Court has
rejected the claim that certain state functions are inviolate.
For example, in a Fifteenth Amendment case discussed
previously, City of Rome v. United States,28 9 the Court upheld a
section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 even though it required a
political subdivision of a state to submit all of its electoral
changes-including changes in the Board of Education voting
system-to the federal government for approval. The city claimed
that the federal law violated principles of federalism. The Court
responded with an unequivocal rejection of any sort of federalism
limitation on Congress's power under the Civil War Amendments:
"[P]rinciples of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to
enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.'
Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."
29 0
Nor is City of Rome confined to cases involving race discrimina-
tion. In the landmark case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,29 1 the Court
rejected this view. In Fitzpatrick, a gender discrimination case, the
Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment works as
a limitation on other provisions of the Constitution:
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principles of
state sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 'by
appropriate legislation' the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limita-
289 446 U.S. 156 (1980); see supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
2o City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179.
291 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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tions on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not
only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority
under one section of a constitutional amendment whose other
sections by their own terms embody limitations of state authori-
ty.292
Specifically, in Fitzpatrick the Court held that Congress could
bring the states, in their capacity as employers, within the coverage
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964293 and authorize the
recovery of monetary damages against the states, even though the
Eleventh Amendment would prohibit such awards absent a federal
statute.294 The Eleventh Amendment, like the Tenth, is a reserva-
tion of power to the states; it prohibits a suit by a citizen against a
state. The Court held in Fitzpatrick that Congress can create a cause
of action to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment even though such a cause of action would otherwise
violate the Eleventh Amendment.
Politically, Fitzpatrick is a fascinating opinion: there were no
dissenting opinions and thenJustice Rehnquist, who later dissented
in City of Rome,295 wrote the Court's opinion. Doctrinally, the
case is historic. Fitzpatrick was a gender discrimination case and it
thus extends the principle of City of Rome-that there are no
federalism limitations on the enforcement powers of the Civil War
Amendments-to cases involving forms of discrimination other than
race. Although Congress originally passed Title VII pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power,296 Congress relied on its section 5
power in enacting the 1972 amendments extending Title VII to
cover the states.297  Thus, Fitzpatrick makes it clear that Con-
gress's section 5 power enables it to prohibit forms of discrimina-
292 Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
293 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination.
294 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456-57.
295 Butsee Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,559 (1975) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting)
("Congress may well be empowered under the legislative authority granted to it by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution to impose significant
restrictions on what would otherwise be thought state prerogatives.") In another
political twist to Fitzpatrick, then-Solicitor General Robert Bork submitted a long brief
for the United States as amicus curiae urging the Court to recognize the historical
shift in power from the states to the federal government produced by the Civil War
Amendments. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 446.
296 
See 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1020
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) [hereinafter U.S. STATUTORY HISTORY].
27 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 n.9.
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tion other than race discrimination. The alleged federalism
limitation on congressional power to address non-racial discrimina-
tion, recited by Justice Black in Mitchell, is now defunct.
Moreover, at the time the Court decided Fitzpatrick, the
minimum standard of scrutiny prevailed in equal protection
challenges to gender discrimination. 298 It was not until some six
months after Fitzpatrick, in Craig v. Boren,2" that the Court held
gender to be a protected class in equal protection cases. While it
is arguable that in previous cases the Court had applied a height-
ened scrutiny standard sub silentio,300 only one of those cases
preceded the 1972 amendments to Title VII and in that case the
Court plainly stated that it was applying the minimal "rational
relationship" test.301 Congress thus prohibited gender discrimina-
tion under its section 5 power before the Court embraced gender
as a protected class.
This argument gains force in light of Justice Stevens's concur-
rence in Fitzpatrick, where he declared that Connecticut had not, in
fact, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs originally
claimed that the state's disparate retirement ages and benefits
constituted a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
298 To understand this Comment's argument, it is necessary to understand the
basics of equal protection law. The Court applies three different standards of
scrutiny to equal protection claims, depending on the kind of discrimination alleged.
State action alleged to discriminate on the basis of race, color or national origin
receives "strict scrutiny." That is, such laws must be necessay to further a compelling
governmental interest. State action alleged to discriminate on the basis of gender
receives an intermediate scrutiny. Such laws must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest. All other classifications, including those based on
age, disability, sexual orientation, and economics, receive the minimum rational basis
scrutiny. Those classifications need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective. SeeJoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448-49,
722 (2d ed. 1983). AsJustice O'Connor has pointed out, the standards of review are
not merely a "lawyers' quibble over words." Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct.
2997, 3033 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Rather, the "standard of review
establishes whether and when the Court and Constitution allow the Government to
employ.., classifications." Id. This Comment argues, inter alia, that because the
Court has upheld and recognized congressional authority to prohibit state actions
that, at the time Congress acted, would not have been subject to strict scrutiny,
Congress has the power to help the Court define the limits of the Equal Protection
Clause.
299 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
300 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); see also Tribe, supra note 80, at 1561-63.
30' Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
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district court did not reach that issue. But Justice Stevens, concur-
ring in the judgment in Fitzpatrick, did reach the issue:
I do not believe plaintiffs proved a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and because I am not sure that the 1972 Amend-
ments were "needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," see Katzenbach v. Morgan, I question whether § 5 of
that Amendment is an adequate reply to Connecticut's Eleventh
Amendment defense.
30 2
Thus, the only judge or justice to reach the issue concluded that the
plaintiffs had not made out a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself. Unlike Justice Stevens, the rest of the Court, well aware
of the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit
Connecticut's retirement statute, did not believe it was necessary to
reach that issue. Whether or not the state law violated the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress had prohibited such laws under its
section 5 enforcement power.
If Congress could prohibit gender discrimination in 1972 under
its section 5 power, it follows that Congress could, in 1992, prohibit
age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, or disability
discrimination under its section 5 power even though the Court has
never held that the Fourteenth Amendment affords these classes of
people anything more than the lowest level of equal protection
scrutiny.
303
This is not a radical proposition. As we have seen, in Thirteenth
Amendment cases, the Court readily accepts the view that Congress
is the appropriate branch to define and remedy the badges of
slavery--badges that the Court has never held violative of the
Thirteenth Amendment. 30 4 Additionally, in the field of disability
discrimination, Congress frequently has used its section 5 power.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was based on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court has twice noted.30 5 The
302 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
303 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(purportedly applying minimum rationality review to a challenge tozoning laws that
discriminated against the mentally retarded); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979)
(applying the rational basis test in an equal protection challenge to age discrimina-
tion); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)
(same); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (1984) (holding
that classifications based on sexual orientation are not suspect), aff'd by a divided
Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
304 See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
305 See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 469, 472 n.4
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Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,3' which authorizes
damages actions against the states,30 7 also relies on Congress's
section 5 power.3 08  The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act
of 1986, which waives the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Congress's section 5 power, applies its provisions not only to
situations of disability discrimination but also to age and gender
discrimination.3 0 9 And the very statute at issue in Fitzpatrick, the
1972 amendments to Title VII, in addition to prohibiting race and
gender discrimination, also prohibits discrimination based on
religion. It is thus clear that if Mitchell established any federalism
limitation (or any limitation at all) on Congress's ability to extend
equal protection guarantees to forms of discrimination other than
race discrimination, that limitation is now moribund-for Fitzpatrick
holds that Congress can abrogate federalism barriers pursuant to its
section 5 power even when it is remedying non-race discrimination.
In EEOC v. Wyoming,310 the Court again declared that federal-
ism concerns do not block Congress's ability to exercise its section
5 power. In that case, the EEOC brought suit against the State of
Wyoming under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),311 challenging the state's mandatory retirement of its
game wardens at age fifty-five. The Court upheld the ADEA as a
valid exercise of Congress's commerce power despite the Tenth
Amendment. The Court declined to decide whether the ADEA
would also be a valid exercise of Congress's section 5 power.
3 12
(1987) (plurality opinion); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 244 n.4
(1985). In Atascadero, the Court held that Congress had not abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit by enacting the Rehabilitation Act because
Congress had not expressly stated its intention to abrogate that immunity. See id at
247. Congress then enacted the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (CRREA),
expressly stating its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988). The CRREA was itself
enacted pursuant to Congress's § 5 power. See 132 CONG. REC. S10,876 (daily ed.
Aug. 1, 1985, pt. II) (statement of Sen. Cranston) (invoking § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Spending Clause as congressional authority for the Senate bill
designed to overturn Atascadero); see also 132 CONG. REC. S15,105 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston) (discussing letter from Department ofJustice,
Office of Legislative Affairs stating that the Senate bill to overturn Atascadero would
be a constitutional exercise of congressional power).
306 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 1990).
507 See id. § 12202 (Supp. 1990).
108 See id. § 12101(b)(4). This section also cites the commerce power as authority
for the Act.
" See supra note 305.
3'o 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
l 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
512 See EEOC, 460 U.S. at 243. However, except for the district court reversed in
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But, the Court added, "[w]e do reaffirm that when properly
exercising its power under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same
Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers."
31 3
Joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, Chief
Justice Burger dissented, claiming that Congress could only act
under the enforcement powers of the Civil War Amendments
"where a violation lurks."3 14  Chief Justice Burger claimed that
Mitchell imposed a limitation on Congress's section 5 power that
prevented Congress from so acting.3 15 The dissent stressed that
because the Court had never decided whether age discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause, the ADEA could only be
sustained if "Congress can define rights wholly independently of our
case law."
316
The dissent's implication seems to be that Fitzpatrick was a
legitimate exercise of congressional power because the Court
recognizes gender discrimination as prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause. Yet, as we have seen, gender was not a protected
class under the equal protection clause at the time the Court
decided Fitzpatrick. Likewise, if the EEOC dissent were correct, the
Americans With Disabilities Act would be unconstitutional as
applied to the states, as would the Civil Rights Remedies Equaliza-
tion Act because the Court has never held age or disability discrimi-
nation as receiving anything but the lowest level of constitutional
scrutiny.3 17 As we shall see in greater detail, the very statute at
issue in Fitzpatrick would be unconstitutional under the EEOC
dissent's standard because that statute extended Title VII's prohibi-
EEOC, every federal court that has considered the issue has concluded that the ADEA
is a valid section 5 enforcement statute. See id. at 234 & n.6.
313 Id. at 243 n.18.
314 Id. at 260 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
315 See id. at 262-63 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (claiming that "[a]llowing Congress
to protect constitutional rights that it has independently defined fundamentally alters
our scheme of government").
316 Id. at 262 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
317 At oral argument in EEOC, the Solicitor General argued that by applying even
the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, i.e., the rational basis test, to cases of age
discrimination, the Court had implicitly agreed with Congress that age is a protected
class under the Equal Protection Clause. See EEOC, 460 U.S. at 261 n.7 (Burger, C..,
dissenting). This novel argument supports congressional authority to remedy
discrimination somewhat independently of the case law. Yet it might also draw a
sensible line against congressional overreaching. Congressional attempts to apply the
Equal Protection Clause to entities to which the Court has not applied even the
rational basis test, such as fetuses, would fail under this approach.
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tion on discriminatory effects even though a discriminatory purpose
is necessary to violate the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Even the
voting age provision for federal elections upheld in Mitchell would
be unconstitutional (unless the Court thought that the separate
reason for its constitutionality espoused only by Justice Black was a
sufficient alternative basis for that provision)."'
The Court also rejected a federalism limitation on Congress's
section 5 power in Maher v. Gagne. 19 In Maher, a working recipi-
ent of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) sued a
state official responsible for administering AFDC, alleging both
statutory and constitutional violations. The parties had reached a
settlement in which the recipient received substantially all of the
relief she had sought in federal court. Even though no constitution-
al violation had been proved, the court awarded attorney's fees
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.320
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court, holding that
"even if the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise present a barrier
to an award of fees against a State, Congress was clearly acting
within its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
removing that barrier." 21 It is clear there are no federalism
barriers to Congress's section 5 power.
2. Gregory v. Ashcroft: Federalism Sneaks in the Back Door
In a recent case, Gregory v. Ashcroft,3 22 the Supreme Court
again considered the ADEA. Although it was a Commerce Clause
case, the Court went out of its way to address the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Gregoy, Missouri state courtjudges challenged the
state's mandatory retirement provision. The state presented a
Tenth Amendment defense. The Court found no violation of the
ADEA because it believed that principles of federalism required it
to adopt a "plain statement rule."3 23 That is, the Court believed
it was obligated to find that Congress did not intend to abrogate the
state's Tenth Amendment immunity unless Congress made its
318 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
319 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
320 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
321 Maher, 448 U.S. at 132; see also Monnell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (stating that there is no constitutional impediment
under either the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments to holding municipalities liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
322 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
3 23 Id. at 2401.
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intention to do so "'unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.'"3 24 In light of the plain statement rule, the Court be-
lieved that without further guidance from Congress, it should
interpret an exception in the ADEA for "appointee[s] 'on the
policymaking level'" to include judges3 25 Therefore, the judges
lost their challenge to the retirement provision.
The plain statement rule was a product of the Court's federalism
concerns in considering the reach of a statute based on Congress's
commerce power.3 26  The Court noted, however, that since
Congress might have enacted the ADEA based on section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, one could argue that the federalism
concerns "that compel the result in this case might carry less
weight."3 27 "But," the Court declared in a remarkable statement,
"this Court has never held that the [Fourteenth] Amendment may
be applied in complete disregard for a State's constitutional
powers." 328  This was simply not true. As we have seen,
Fitzpatrick, City of Rome, and Maher established that Congress is unre-
strained by federalism concerns (derived from either the Tenth or
Eleventh Amendments) in legislating under the enforcement
provision of the Civil War Amendments because those Amendments
"were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an
intrusion on state sovereignty."329 The only possibly relevant
difference between Fitzpatrick and Gregory was that Fitzpatrick
involved the federalism concerns of the Eleventh Amendment rather
than the Tenth. However, since the Court in Gregory imported the
plain statement rule into Tenth Amendment jurisprudence from
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 33 0 one could hardly expect
the Court to use this distinction.
The Court simply ignored Fitzpatrick's clear holding. The Court
may be attempting to use Gregoy to establish language stating that
federalism concerns limit the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
might want to use that language later on to overturn statutes based
on Congress's section 5 power.
In defense of its notion that "the States' power to define the
qualifications of their officeholders has force even as against the
324 Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
325 Id. at 2404 (quoting ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988)).
326 See id. at 2401.
s2 Id. at 2405.
328 Id.
s29 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
330 See supra note 305.
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proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment,"331 the Gregoy
Court cited a line of cases holding that even though aliens are a
discrete and insular minority who receive the highest level of
protection under the Equal Protection Clause, that level of
protection is lowered when states exclude aliens from important
political functions in state government.
3 3 2
The case that spawned this line was, ironically, Sugarman v.
Dougal.333 The irony lies in the fact that in Dougal the Court
upheld an equal protection challenge to a state statute that discrimi-
nated against aliens. It was only in dictum,334 after the Court had
reached its holding, that the Court stated that, as a matter of
federalism, aliens' equal protection challenges to certain political
functions would receive the lowest level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.335 In support of this notion, the Court cited
Justice Black's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell.
33 6
Since its decision in Dougal, the Court has applied the dictum in
several cases. These cases hold that state laws excluding aliens from
positions as state troopers,337 public school teachers,338 and
deputy probation officers33 9 are constitutional, while a state law
excluding aliens from working as notaries public is unconstitution-
al. 40 In Grego7y, the Court concluded that "[t]hese cases demon-
strate that the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all
principles of federalism."
3 41
The Court fails to notice, however, that in the Dougal line of
cases no act of Congress was at issue. As Justice White said in
dissent, "it is one thing to limit judicially-created scrutiny, and it is
quite another to fashion a restraint on Congress' legislative authority,
as does the majority; the latter is both counter-majoritarian and an
intrusion on a co-equal branch of the federal government."3 42 By
331 Gregoiy, 111 S. Ct. at 2405.
332 See id.
333 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
334 See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 303 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that the political function doctrine in Dougal is dictum).
335 See Dougal, 413 U.S. at 646-49.
336 See id. at 647 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970) (Black,
J.) (footnote omitted)).
337 See Foley, 435 U.S. at 291.
33 8 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)
339 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
340 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
341 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (1991).34 2 Id. at 2410 (White, J., dissenting).
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importing the holdings from the aliens cases into an age discrimina-
tion case, the Gregory Court seems to be hinting that it will invali-
date acts of Congress that tread on state functions regardless of the
form of discrimination at issue.
To summarize Gregory, the Court dragged the Fourteenth
Amendment into a Commerce Clause case, ignored clear Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment precedent holding that no federalism analysis
is even required under the Fourteenth Amendment, imposed an
Eleventh Amendment-based rule of statutory construction on a
Tenth Amendment case, and borrowed a limitation on the Four-
teenth Amendment from a special class of cases addressing aliens'
rights-a class of cases that says nothing about congressional power
under that Amendment. The only good news for the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gregory was that the limitation announced by the
Court was merely a rule of statutory construction. 34 3 Gregory will
not apply in cases where Congress has clearly stated its intent to
abrogate federalism barriers under the Civil War Amendments'
enforcement powers.
It is vital that federalism barriers not be erected against
Congress's section 5 power because federalism barriers are
beginning to creep into the Court's interpretation of Congress's
commerce power. Currently, Congress can regulate the states under
its commerce power. This was established in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority3 44 in which the Court upheld a
federal minimum wage for state employees against a Tenth
Amendment challenge and in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,3 45 in
which the Court upheld a provision of the Superfund law authoriz-
ing damages actions against the states despite the Eleventh
Amendment. But in the Court's most recent treatment of the
Commerce Clause, New York v. United States,346 the Court invali-
dated a provision of federal law that required the states to establish
disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste produced in-state, enter
into regional compacts with other states for disposal, or take title of
the waste themselves and assume all liability for the waste. In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that, while the
343 See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 566 (1991)
(stating that the plain statement rule of Gregory should be treated as a rule of
statutory construction "rather than as a rule of constitutional law").
344 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
345 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
346 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
CAN CONGRESS SAVE US?
commerce power enables the federal government to preempt state
regulation with its own regulations, principles of federalism
embodied in the Tenth Amendment prohibit the federal govern-
ment from directing the states to regulate activities when they
choose not to do so.347 In reaching its holding, the Court exten-
sively examined the history of the Constitution and concluded that
the Constitution embodied a major shift in the role of the national
government from one that regulated the states to one that regulates
individuals.3 48  In dissent, Justice White claimed that the
majority's analysis failed to acknowledge the major shift in the
structure of the Constitution following the Civil War. That war, he
declared, produced a change so profound that "the persons who
helped to found the Republic would scarcely have recognized the
many added roles the National Government assumed for itself."
3 49
Gregory and New York seem to signal the Court's increasing
concern for federalism issues. If federalism barriers become
established in Commerce Clause cases, then the commerce power
will be limited to private-sector regulation and congressional
attempts to prohibit state-sponsored discrimination will fall
primarily on the section 5 power.35 0 Yet, even if the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments limit the reach of the commerce power,
surely the enforcement powers of the Civil War Amendments are on
a different footing. For those amendments followed the Tenth
Amendment and were "specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."3 51 The Civil
War Amendments must be understood and applied in their
historical context as part of a profound shift in power from the
states to the national government. That is the meaning of the
Court's opinions in City of Rome and Fitzpatrick.
347 See id. at 2424, 2428-29.
348 See id. at 2421-23.
3 49 Id. at 2444 n.3 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
350 Lest it appear that this Comment is simply a liberal tirade against an
increasingly conservative Court, the reader is urged to note that this writer considers
Garcia to have been wrongly reasoned and probably to have been wrongly decided as
well. This writer believes that the Tenth Amendment does reserve to the states, as
against the commerce power, certain functions necessary to sovereignty but that the
Civil War Amendments give Congress absolute power to abrogate federalism barriers.
s1 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
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III. PROGNOSIS FOR THE RFRA, THE FOCA, AND THE RJA
3 52
A. The RJA
In Morgan, the Court described the test for whether legislation
is an "appropriate" exercise of the section 5 power as involving
three steps. The courts must determine whether the statute at issue
"may be regarded as an enactment to enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether it is "'plainly adapted to that end'" and
whether "it is not prohibited by but consistent with the 'letter and
spirit of the constitution.'"
353
Professor Laurence Tribe has identified three constitutional
grounds on which Congress could enact the RJA.354 First, Con-
gress could enact the RJA to remedy race discrimination against
defendants charged with capital crimes. Second, Congress could
enact the RJA to remedy race discrimination against victims of
capital crimes. Third, Congress could enact the RJA to remedy
"society's demeaning vision of blacks as second-class citizens."355
The bill as written takes all three approaches.
356
The first ground would require Congress to prohibit discrimina-
tory effects when the Court has declared, in McCleskey, that a
discriminatory purpose is necessary to demonstrate a constitutional
violation.3 57 Morgan, South Carolina, Mitchell, Metro Broadcasting,
Fitzpatrick, and City of Rome support Congress's ability to do so. City
of Rome provides particularly forceful support for the RJA. In that
case the Court held that Congress could prohibit voting schemes
with discriminatory effects even though it held the same day, in
Mobile v. Bolden, that a discriminatory purpose is required to
demonstrate that those schemes violate the constitution. Even then
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case could accommodate the RJA.
Justice Rehnquist believed that "congressional prohibition of some
conduct which may not itself violate the Constitution" is a valid use
352 This section examines the constitutionality of the three bills under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In some cases, there are other constitutional bases for the
bills, such as the commerce power or the spending power. Those bases, while
extremely important, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
53 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
354 See 136 CONG. REC. S6891-92 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) [hereinafter Letter of
Professor Tribe] (reprinting letter from Professor Tribe to Sen. Kennedy).
55 Id. at S6892.
356 See S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(6), 3(a) (1991).
357 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
CAN CONGRESS SAVE US?
of the enforcement power "if that prohibition is necessary to
remedy prior constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or
if necessary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination by a
governmental unit."358 He thought that Congress could "con-
clude that as a remedial matter it was necessary to place the burden
of proving lack of discriminatory purpose on the localities." 59 As
Professor Tribe has noted, Justice Rehnquist only objected to
Congress's ability to place an "irrebuttable presumption" of
discriminatory purpose on the states when Congress had identified
only discriminatory effects.
3 60
The RJA creates no such irrebuttable presumption. Rather, the
bill provides that a demonstration of discriminatory effects
establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination. The State is
then entitled to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that
nonracial factors persuasively explain the disparities.3 61 Thus,
unlike the statute at issue in City of Rome, which prompted Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, the RJA creates no irrebuttable presumption of
discriminatory purpose.
Moreover, City of Rome is not the only case demonstrating that
Congress can prohibit discriminatory effects where the Constitution
alone prohibits only discriminatory purposes. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,3 62 the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits employment practices with discriminatory effects,
even though the Court has declared as a "basic equal protection
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose."3 63 Of course, Congress passed Title VII pursuant to its
commerce power.3 64 But as the Court recognized in Connecticut
v. Teal,3 65 the same 1972 amendments that extended Title VII to
the states under Congress's section 5 power "endorsed the dispa-
rate-impact analysis employed by the Court in Griggs."3 66 In Teal,
358 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
359 Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
s60 Id. at 215 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting), quoted in Letter of Professor Tribe, supra
note 354, at S6891.
361 See S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991).
362 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
363 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see also Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment principle requiring a demonstration of discriminatory intent).
364 See U.S. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 296, at 1020.
365 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
366 Id. at 447 n.8.
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a case which presented a disparate-impacts claim against a state, the
Court examined the legislative history of the 1972 amendments and
found that Congress intended "to provide state and municipal
employees with the protection that Title VII, as interpreted by
Griggs, had provided to employees in the private sector." 67 Thus,
the Court recognized that, by extending disparate-impacts claims to
cases against the states, Congress prohibited activity not prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment itself.368 Although the Court in
Teal did not directly address whether the application of Griggs to
public employers was constitutional, the courts of appeals that have
considered the issue have unanimously held that, under Morgan, the
1972 amendments are a valid exercise of the Congress's section 5
power.3 69 Moreover, the 1991 Civil Rights Act made disparate-
impacts claims an explicit part of the statute.370 As applied to
public employers, this new provision demonstrates once again that
under its section 5 power, Congress can prohibit discriminatory
effects or other activity not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself.
3 71
In addition to the precedential support of Griggs and Teal,
Professor Tribe's first approach to the RJA passes muster under the
three-pronged Morgan test. The RJA is unquestionably an enact-
ment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The findings of the
bill refer repeatedly to equal protection rights372 and it is aimed
at racial discrimination-the most suspect form of discrimination.
As Justice Black stated in Mitchell, "the Civil War Amendments were
unquestionably designed to condemn and forbid every distinction,
however trifling, on account of race."
373
367 Id. at 449.
368 See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977) ("Congress
expressly indicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to
governmental and private employers alike.").
369 See Guardians Ass'n of New York City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 630
F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Scott v. City of Anniston,
597 F.2d 897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); Blake v. City
of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-74 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir. 1978).
370 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 20OOe-2(k) (West Supp. 1992).
371 It is worth noting that Smith also represents an intent standard. By holding
generally applicable religion neutral laws to a lower standard than laws that explicitly
target religion, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, the Court is effectively
requiring proof of a discriminatory intent.
372 See S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
373 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 127 (1970) (Black, J.) (emphasis added).
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The RJA is also plainly adapted to its enforcement goal. In
Morgan the Court declared, "it is enough that we perceive a basis
upon which Congress might predicate" an enforcement statute.
3 74
The dissent described this test as a minimum "rationality" re-
view.3 75 In introducing the Racial Justice Act, Senator Kennedy
also introduced voluminous evidence demonstrating that a pattern
of racial discrimination in capital sentencing appears "injurisdiction
after jurisdiction around the country."3 76  Senator Kennedy's
evidence demonstrated that such a pattern exists in Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, Ohio, and Texas. Certainly, this evidence is
more than enough for the Court to perceive a basis upon which
Congress might have acted.
Finally, the RJA is not prohibited by and is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. As we have seen, federalism
concerns do not constrain Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power. Yet, Gregory might mean that if the Court were strongly
determined to find the RJA unconstitutional, it would do so under
federalism principles. The Court did state in McCleskey that "'[o]ne
of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its
citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task
is through criminal laws against murder.'" 7 7 It is possible that
the Court could classify this "basic task" as one belonging to the
states the same way the Court in Gregoy thought that "the States'
power to define the qualifications of their officeholders" was a task
belonging to the states.37 8  That would be a wholly irrational
setback to the struggle for equality of the races in this country. The
Fourteenth Amendment is immune from federalism limitations.
Professor Tribe's second approach to the RJA provides no
problem in terms of counteracting the Supreme Court: in McCleskey
the Court did not address whether the disparities in capital
sentencing based on the race of victims violated the equal protection
rights of the victims. Not having considered the issue, the Court
could not and did not reject the idea that the disparity violated the
victims' equal protection rights.3 79 Only if this section of the RJA
374 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
375 Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
376 137 CONG. REc. S7380 (daily ed.June 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
377 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
378 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (1991).
379 Such a claim could not have been brought in McClkey because no party had
standing to raise the victim's rights. See Letter of Professor Tribe, supra note 554, at
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violates some other constitutional provision-and it does not-would
there be a problem with the constitutionality of the RJA.
The RJA takes the third approach in declaring "the interest in
ensuring equal justice under law may be harmed, not only by
decisions motivated by explicit racial bias, but also by government
rules, policies, and practices that operate to reinforce the subordi-
nate status to which racial minorities were relegated in our
society."38 0  Professor Tribe notes that the Court validated this
approach in Brown v. Board of Education.38 1 There the Court held
that racial discrimination harms racial minorities because it
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the communi-
ty."382 Under this approach, the RJA is viewed as enabling racial
minorities to gain nondiscriminatory treatment throughout society
just as the first Morgan rationale held that granting Puerto Ricans an
unencumbered suffrage right helped them gain nondiscriminatory
treatment throughout society. Under this approach, it is not the
racial disparities in capital sentencing that violate the Equal
Protection Clause, but the inferior social status to which minorities
are relegated when they cannot be free from discriminatory prosecu-
tions and sentences that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The third approach passes muster under the Morgan test. First,
it is clearly aimed at enforcing the equal protection rights of
minorities. Second, the Court could perceive a basis for the RJA in
seeking to prevent the relegation of minorities to a "subordinate
status" in society as that is one of the bill's stated goals. Finally, the
third approach to the RJA would not violate any federalism
principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment because, as we have
seen, federalism principles do not, by definition, limit Congress's
section 5-power.
Some have read McCleskey as an outright irivitation for Congress
to enact legislation like the RFRA.38 3 This notion comes from the
end of the MCleskey opinion, where the Court stressed that the
S6892. Because victims are not parties to criminal prosecutions and because victims
of capital crimes tend to be dead, the protection of potential victims' rights is an
especially difficult task for the Courts and an especially appropriate task for Congress.
380 S. 1249, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(6) (1991).
381 347 U.S. 483 (1954), cited in Letter of Professor Tribe, supra note 354, at
S6892.
382 Id. at 494.
383 See e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H9008 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Schroeder) (declaring that the RJA takes up a challenge from the Supreme Court to
prohibit racial disparities in capital sentencing under Congress's § 5 power).
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concerns presented in the case are best addressed by legislative
bodies. However, it is worth noting that the Court twice used the
plural, "legislatures," in making that point.384 The Court was
referring to state legislative determinations as to "the appropriate
punishment for particular crimes," not legislative determinations as
to equal protection violations385 Nonetheless, Congress need not
await an invitation to exercise its constitutional powers.
B. The FOCA
The immediate and obvious problem for the FOCA is that the
Court could overrule Roe. Should this happen, one might wonder
how Congress could protect the abortion right. But there are
several reasons why this is not a dispositive issue. First, overruling
Roe would not entirely remove the abortion right from the Four-
teenth Amendment. Even those Justices who advocate overruling
Roe recognize the abortion right as a "liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause,"38 6 albeit one with a low level of constitu-
tional protection. Under this response, the right still exists and thus
Congress can remedy its violation. The Solicitor General made this
argument in an age discrimination case already discussed, EEOC v.
Wyoming.387 He argued that because the Court had subjected age
discrimination cases to equal protection scrutiny (albeit the lowest
level of scrutiny), the Court had implicitly recognized that age
discrimination comes within the ambit of the Equal Protection
Clause.3 88  The Court did not reject this argument because it
never reached the Fourteenth Amendment issue, having upheld the
statute at issue under Congress's commerce power. So the
argument might well be valid.
Second, we simply are not likely to enter a post-Roe world and
the RJA does not expand the abortion right beyond the perimeters
established in Roe. Casey reaffirmed Roe's basic holding and the
right Congress seeks to protect is thus clearly established (and likely
to remain so now that a supporter of abortion-rights occupies the
White House). Professor Douglas Kmiec criticized the original
version of the FOCA, testifying to Congress that the bill expanded
" McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (emphasis added).
385 Id.
386 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
387 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
3' See id. at 261 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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the abortion right beyond Roe and established "abortion on
demand."38 9  In response to the criticism, Senator Cranston
introduced the most recent version of the FOCA, which "make[s] it
absolutely clear" that the FOCA does not establish any rights
beyond Roe.3 90 As long as Casey is good law, the FOCA will build
upon an established right.
Third, in a post-Roe world, Congress could define the substance
of the abortion right under its section 5 power. Fitzpatrick, Morgan,
South Carolina, City of Rome, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, and the
holdings of Mitchell as to the federal voting age and nationwide ban
on literacy tests, support Congress's ability to do this. The
opponents of the FOCA have tried to put these cases in a box by
seizing on justice Rehnquist's "remedial" characterization in his City
of Rome dissent and on Justice Harlan's "remedial" characterization
in his Morgan dissent.3 91 They claim that the first Morgan ratio-
nale only allows Congress to remedy past violations of the Constitu-
tion as defined by the Court and that the second rationale of Morgan,
giving Congress broad power to disagree with the Court as to the
scope of a right, was simply an alternative holding to which the
Court would no longer adhere.
3 92
This description of the first Morgan rationale is simply wrong.
The first Morgan rationale holds that Congress can differ with the Court
over the scope of a right when that right is necessary to eliminate other
389 1992 FOCA Hearings, supra note 276 (statement of Professor Douglas Kmiec
at 1). Professor Kmiec's declaration that Congress possessed the power to extend due
process protection to embryos and fetuses, see id. (statement of Professor Douglas
Kmiec at 17-18 n.6 & 32-34), but not to pregnant women should have given the
committee some reason to doubt his analysis. If Congress lacks the power to expand
the rights of women, whom everyone agrees are "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then Congress must lack the power to expand the rights of fetuses and
embryos, entities for which there is no consensus as to personhood. The Department
ofJustice made the same inconsistent (indeed ridiculous) argument as Professor
Kmiec, see id. (statement of Timothy E. Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General
at 18 n.23), although the Department's intellectual inconsistency may be excused as
the result of impossible political constraints.
390 138 CONG. REc. S9027 (daily ed.June 25, 1992) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
391 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).392 See 1992 FOCA Hearings, supra note 276 (statement of Timothy E. Flanigan,
Acting Assistant Attorney General at 20) (arguing that the FOCA has "no valid
remedial purpose" because it does not prohibit practices the Court has declared
unconstitutional); id. (statement of Professor Douglas W. Kmiec at 19) (stating that
Morgan, "upon which pro-abortion supporters of FOCA so heavily rely for authority,
merely approves of congressional action that is remedial and necessarily bounded by
the interpretative meaning that the Supreme Court has drawn from the Constitu-
tion").
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discriminatory practices. It is those other practices rather than the
practice Congress is prohibiting that violate the Constitution.3
93
The "remedial" distinction is appealing because it seems to draw a
bright line between valid and invalid acts of Congress: those
addressing constitutional violations as defined by the Court are
valid, whereas those addressing activity the Court has not declared
unconstitutional are invalid. But this clearly is not the case. The
first Morgan rationale still required Congress to disagree with a
prior Court interpretation, as Justice Harlan's dissent made
clear.394  Indeed, Justice Harlan would have had no reason to
dissent if the first Morgan rationale did not require the Court to
empower Congress to disagree with the scope of a right. Moreover,
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Rome recognizes "congressional
prohibition of some conduct which may not itself violate the
Constitution." 95  The "remedial" characterization of the first
Morgan rationale is thus inaccurate both as a characterization of
Morgan and as a characterization of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
City of Rome. Additionally, as recently as 1990 the Court rejected a
remedial limitation on Congress's section 5 power in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC.96 In that case, the Court approved congres-
sional authority to prohibit discrimination under its section 5 power
without requiring Congress to unearth past constitutional violations:
"[t]oday the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a govern-
mental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissi-
ble except as a remedy for a past wrong." 97 Those who use the
"remedial" characterization as a talisman against Congress's section
5 power are mistaken. It is clear that under Congress's section 5
power, Congress can prohibit restrictions on the abortion right
whether or not the Court agrees that the Fourteenth Amendment
encompasses an abortion right.
Fourth, the FOCA is based not simply on Congress's ability to
protect the due process right to abortion. It is also based on
Congress's ability to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The
FOCA sets forth a series of findings which include the finding that
restrictions on the abortion right "discriminate between women who
are able to afford interstate and international travel and women who
393 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53.
394 See id. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
395 City of Rome, 446 U.S. 156, 213 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
396 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
397 Id. at 3028 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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are not, a disproportionate number of whom belong to racial or
ethnic minorities."3 9 8  Protecting the equal protection rights of
women and racial minorities does not require Congress to extend
the Fourteenth Amendment to formerly unprotected classes of
people. Gender and race discrimination are well within the ambit
of the Equal Protection Clause as defined by the Court.3 99 Thus,
like the RJA, the FOCA could be upheld as a measure that protects
rights the Court clearly recognizes.
In the congressional hearings on the FOCA, Professor Kmiec
and the Justice Department attacked the equal protection argument
and cited Geduldig v. Aiello.400 That case held that a state classifi-
cation denying benefits based on pregnancy did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Geduldig established that the states may
treat pregnant persons differently from nonpregnant persons
without violating the Equal Protection Clause because, while the
former group is exclusively female, the latter group is not exclusive-
ly male.
40 1
However, Geduldig does not prohibit Congress from prohibiting
pregnancy discrimination. If it were otherwise, then the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act,40 2 as applied to the states, would be unconsti-
tutional. This Act is an amendment to Title VII making pregnancy
discrimination a form of gender discrimination.
Moreover, Geduldig does not prohibit Congress from granting
women rights that will help them secure nondiscriminatory
treatment throughout society. By passing the FOCA, Congress
would be declaring that without control over their bodies and their
reproductive futures, women cannot enjoy the equal protection of
the laws with respect to jobs, housing, political participation, etc.
This is a straightforward application of the first Morgan rationale:
when women die or are permanently incapacitated or when they
must travel great distances or bear significant costs to exercise
control over their bodies, they cannot enjoy the blessings of liberty
398 S. 25, Version 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(2)(C) (1992).
399 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that gender is within the
ambit of the Equal Protection Clause); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982) (gender); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race).
400 417 U.S. 484 (1974), cited in 1992 FOCA Hearings, supra note 276 (statement
of Timothy E. Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General) (memorandum attached
to unpublished statement at 20); id. (statement of Professor Douglas W. Kmiec)
(unpublished statement at 20).
401 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
402 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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or function as equal members of the polity. Moreover, Geduldig
does not apply at all to situations of race discrimination. In
considering the FOCA, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee explicitly relied on racial disparities: "It]he mortality
rate from illegal abortions was twelve times as great for women of
color than for white women from 1972 to 1974. -403
Without running through the Morgan analysis for every possible
Fourteenth Amendment right protected by the FOCA, it is clear that
the FOCA would pass muster under one or more of its constitution-
al bases. First, as we have seen, it is clearly aimed at enforcing
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Second, it is plainly adapted to its
enforcement goals. From the testimony and information provided
to Congress in support of the FOCA, the Court could easily
perceive a basis upon which Congress could conclude that denial of
the abortion right violates due process and equal protection rights.
Finally, there is no way for federalism limitations to impede
Congress's ability to enact the FOCA. Though the states may have
some history of regulating abortion, 40 4 it is decidedly not an
interest that could be categorized as fundamental to state sovereign-
ty. Though the Court may return to a federalism test in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that declares certain issues, such as the
retirement age at issue in Gregory, as concerns central to the states'
existence as states, the regulation of abortions is certainly not a
governmental function central to the states' political existence.
Abortion regulations do not sustain the states as political units.
Thus, even if the Court were to take the extraordinary step of
importing a federalism limitation into Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, that limitation would not protect state abortion laws
from Congress's section 5 power.
C. The RFRA
One issue we have not yet addressed is whether Congress has
the same power with regard to rights contained in the Bill of Rights
which, unlike rights literally contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself, are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment by
403 S. REP. No. 321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1992).
404 This point has been seized upon by FOCA opponents. See Thomas L.Jipping,
The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Choice Act, in 136 CONG. REc. E1485 (daily ed.
May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (arguing that "[s]tate legislatures
exclusively determined abortion policy for more than 150 YEARS").
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judicial construction." 5 If the Morgan holding does not reach
incorporated rights such as the free exercise right, then Morgan's
historic holding would not support the RFRA.
The Court resolved this issue in Hutto v. Finney.40 6 In Hutto,
the Court upheld an award of attorney's fees in an Eighth Amend-
ment civil rights suit. The Court held that Congress could authorize
an award of attorney's fees even though the Eighth Amendment,
standing alone, would not provide for such an award.40 7 This
holding recognized that under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress can enforce incorporated rights. In fact, the
Eleventh Amendment would have prohibited monetary awards but
for the federal statute.40 8  Nonetheless, the Court held that
"Congress has plenary power to set aside the States's immunity from
retroactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
409
In Hutto, then Justice Rehnquist dissented, declaring that
Congress's power under Fitzpatrick is not the same with regard to
incorporated rights as it is with regard to the prohibitions contained
"in haec verba in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself."410 Justice Rehnquist was addressing a federalism limita-
tion. So even if his view would now carry a majority, it would only
be relevant if the RFRA were to implicate the Tenth or Eleventh
Amendments. But it seems hard to imagine that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's view would carry a majority, regardless of the Court's
composition. Congress's ability to remedy violations of incorporat-
ed rights is well established: it is recognized implicitly in every
§ 1983 action for the violation of incorporated rights. 4 11 In fact,
405 See supra note 30.
406 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
407 See id. at 693-94.
408 See id. at 693-95.
409 Id. at 693.
410 Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
411 In addition to Congress's § 5 power, three Justices have argued that Congress's
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause enables it to expand the free exercise
right-even if Congress thereby diminishes the establishment right as interpreted by
the Court. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),Justice Whitejoined by
ChiefJustice Burger andJustice Stewart, argued that even if the Free Exercise Clause
"does not by its own force require exempting devout objectors from military service,"
Congress can create such an exemption under its power to execute its military
powers. Id. at 371 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, citing Morgan, stated that
Congress could, in exercising its power to execute its military powers, "take account
of the First Amendment and ... avoid possible violations of the Free Exercise
Clause." Id. (White, J., dissenting). Yet the rule created by Congress would have
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it seems to be recognized in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Fitzpatrick, where the Court upheld a statute that prohibits
religious discrimination. Tite VII, both as originally enacted and
as extended to the states under Congress's section 5 power,
prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
412
The foregoing makes it clear that the RFRA would pass the
Morgan test. So long as ChiefJustice Rehnquist's view in Hutto does
not prevail, the RFRA would clearly be enacted to enforce a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right-the incorporated right
to the free exercise of religion. The Court could also "perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did."413 In the hearings on the RFRA, Congress faced an out-
pouring of support for the bill and of hostility to Smith. Liberal and
conservative organizations alike supported the bill and pleaded with
Congress to restore religious freedom.414 Congress could have
concluded that the most appropriate means for dealing with the
problem was to restore the Sherbert test.
Finally, the RFRA would not violate other constitutional
provisions. The RFRA could involve federalism problems only if
federalism limitations are improperly applied to Fourteenth
Amendment cases. But on the hypothesis that the rule of statutory
construction in Gregoy somehow becomes translated into a
constitutional rule, the RFRA could certainly conflict with federal-
ism concerns. For example, a state could fire its Sabbatarian
employees who are unwilling to work on Saturdays and who
perform important governmental functions, implicating the Tenth
Amendment. Or those same employees could sue the state, not for
reinstatement, but for damages under the RFRA, implicating the
Eleventh Amendment. But, to risk repetition, federalism principles
do not restrain Congress's § 5 power.
violated the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause by favoring the
religious over the nonreligious. See id. at 356-58 (Harlanj., concurring in the result)
(citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). The majority sidestepped the
constitutional problems by interpreting the statute so as to exempt both religious and
nonreligious objectors. See id. at 343-44. The dissent in Welsh thus advocates
congressional power to restrict the Court's interpretation of constitutional rights:
threeJustices would have approved congressional power to expand the free exercise
right and to contemporaneously restrict the establishment right. This seems to be the
only opinion to advocate a two-way ratchet.
412 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
413 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
414 See generally 1990 RFRA Hearings, supra note 26.
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An objection to the constitutionality of the RFRA has been
raised based on the Establishment Clause. 415 By passing a law
affecting religion, RFRA critics believe that the law would thereby
become a "law respecting an establishment of religion" as prohibit-
ed by the First Amendment.4 16 But the RFRA specifically declares
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or
in any was address that portion of the first article of amendment to
the Constitution that prohibits laws respecting the establishment of
religion."4 17 As Professor Douglas Laycock declared to Congress,
"[t]he fear that this proviso will codify current interpretations of the
Establishment Clause borders on the irrational.... [A] bill cannot
codify something that it neither affects, interprets, or address-
es."
4 18
A statute challenged under the Establishment Clause is constitu-
tional under the prevailing test if it meets three criteria: "[f]irst, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither inhibits nor advances
religion; finally the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" 4 19 The RFRA's purpose is certainly
not to advance any particular religion. Nor is its purpose to
advance religion at the expense of nonreligion or vice versa.
Rather, the stated purpose of RFRA is "to restore the compelling
state interest test" and "to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religion is burdened by government."420 The RFRA places
all free exercise claims on the same footing, regardless of their
source.
For the same reason, the RFRA's effect will not be to advance
or inhibit religion. To hold that the RFRA advances religion over
nonreligion would require holding that the Court's interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause itself, which embodied a compelling
state interest test for nearly thirty years, violated the Establishment
415 See 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Robert A. Destro
at 15) (arguing that the RFRA as currently drafted might violate the Establishment
Clause).
416 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
417 H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1991).
418 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock at
24).
419 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations omitted); see also Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649, 2655 ("[We do not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the
United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.").
420 H.R. 2797 § 2(b).
CAN CONGRESS SAVE US?
Clause by protecting religious conduct. Finally, the RFRA would
not foster an entanglement with religion. Quite the contrary, by
prohibiting government from burdening religious conduct, the
RFRA would prevent entanglement between government and
religion. The creation of a religious exemption from generally
applicable laws no more violates the Establishment Clause than the
exemption of religious organizations from property taxes.
421
An objection to the RFRA has also been raised on Separation of
Powers grounds.422 However, the Court's latest treatment of the
Separation of Powers doctrine casts doubt on this objection. In
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 423 the Court upheld a federal
statute that declared that the government had met the requirements
of various environmental statutes "that are the basis for the
consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F.
Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary
injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel
Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR." 424  The Court explained that
since Congress had effected "changes in the law"425 rather than
compelled the result in a particular case, Congress had not violated
the Separation of Powers doctrine. If the statute at issue in
Robertson effected changes in the underlying law and did not
"prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way,"426 then the RFRA, which prescribes a general set of rules to
be applied in all free exercise cases, would also simply effect
changes in the law. The RFRA would be a valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement power.
427
421 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
422 See 1992 RFRA Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Robert A. Destro
at 15).
423 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
424 103 Stat. 745 (1990), quoted in Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1411. The statute
allowed logging in old growth forests containing an endangered species-the northern
spotted owl.
425 Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413.
426 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
427 An argument can also be made that the RFRA is a valid exercise of Congress's
power under the first Morgan rationale. Like the denial of a fair criminal trial and the
denial of control over one's own body, the denial of religious rights would
compromise the ability of religious minorities to participate equally in a democratic
society. The Smith case demonstrates this principle: Oregon fired Alfred Smith and
Galen Black for their religious conduct and denied them unemployment benefits.
This risked their ability to feed, clothe, and house themselves. When members of the
polity are unable to provide for such basics, they cannot effectively exercise their
political rights. This approach to the RFRA would likely also pass the Morgan test,
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CONCLUSION
The precise boundaries of Congress's power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot, of course, be settled here. For
purposes of the RFRA, the FOCA, and the RJA, the boundaries
need not be set because those bills are clearly within Congress's
established power. It is also clear that the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, as applied to the states, is a valid exercise
of Congress's section 5 power, as is the prohibition of discriminato-
ry effects in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as applied to the states, as
would be an amendment to Title VII prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in employment. Perhaps those who fear that
Congress's section 5 power endangers the principle of Marbury can
be comforted by something Justice Frankfurter said: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it."
428
There is very little reason to fear that Congress's power under
the Civil War Amendments endangers the principle of Marbury: by
virtue of its holdings in South Carolina, Morgan, Mitchell, City of
Rome, Metro Broadcasting, and Fitzpatrick, the Court implicitly ratified
Congress's expansion of rights and thereby secured its own
supremacy in defining rights. No one argues that because Congress
acted under the enforcement powers of the Civil War Amendments
the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear those cases. Professor Tribe,
who has urged Congress to pass the RFRA, the FOCA, and the RJA,
has declared that "Congress may not legislatively 'create' constitu-
tional rights as a means of circumventing the authority of the
Supreme Court as final expositor of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion."429 Congress can, however, "when authorized by its enumer-
ated powers and not prohibited by any constitutional provision or
principle, establish statutory rights in areas that are of legitimate
national concern."430 Put another way, "being 'ultimate interpret-
er,'.. . is not the same as being exclusive interpreter."
431
since the Court need only find that Congress might have perceived such a basis for
RFRA.
428 Graves v. New York ex tel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
42 1992 FOCA Hearings, supra note 276 (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe
at 2).
4s0 Id.
431 Fisher, supra note 158, at 715.
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The voting rights cases and Fitzpatrick are best viewed as
examples of constitutional growth through inter-branch debate. The
Court issues a thesis; Congress issues an antithesis; the Court issues
a synthesis. So long as the Court retains the power to review acts
of Congress-and no one contends that it does not-then there is
absolutely no need to fear that congressional power under the Civil
War Amendments endangers the Court's authority.

